omitir hasta el contenido
Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development Ver este material de antemano
CerrarVer este material de antemano
Chequeando…

Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development

Autor: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Editorial: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Edición/Formato:   Libro-e : Documento : Inglés (eng)Ver todas las ediciones y todos los formatos
Base de datos:WorldCat
Resumen:
This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may  Leer más
Calificación:

(todavía no calificado) 0 con reseñas - Ser el primero.

Temas
Más materiales como éste

 

Encontrar un ejemplar en línea

Encontrar un ejemplar en la biblioteca

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Encontrando bibliotecas que tienen este material…

Detalles

Tipo de material: Documento, Recurso en Internet
Tipo de documento Recurso internet, Archivo de computadora
Todos autores / colaboradores: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Número OCLC: 153303405
Descripción: 1 online resource (1 volume).
Título de la serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Responsabilidad: Sharon Novak, Scott Stern.

Resumen:

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.

Reseñas

Reseñas contribuidas por usuarios
Recuperando reseñas de GoodReads…
Recuperando reseñas de DOGObooks…

Etiquetas

Ser el primero.
Confirmar este pedido

Ya ha pedido este material. Escoja OK si desea procesar el pedido de todos modos.

Datos enlazados


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development
    a schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book, schema:MediaObject ;
    library:oclcnum "153303405" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/876978> ; # Contracts--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009121751> ; # Contracts--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1165603> ; # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Topic/new_products_economic_aspects> ; # New products--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/970970> ; # Industrial efficiency
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041196> ; # Industrial efficiency
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Topic/vertical_integration_mathematical_models> ; # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    schema:about <http://dewey.info/class/330/> ;
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/18335502> ; # Scott Stern
    schema:contributor <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/77504943> ; # Sharon Novak
    schema:datePublished "2007" ;
    schema:description "This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/126516269> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development"@en ;
    schema:productID "153303405" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/153303405#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2007> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
    schema:url <http://0-papers.nber.org.biblio.eui.eu/papers/> ;
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13232> ;
    schema:url <http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=http://papers.nber.org/papers/> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/153303405> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> ; # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> ; # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Topic/vertical_integration_mathematical_models> # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85142912> ;
    schema:name "Vertical integration--Mathematical models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009121751> # Contracts--Economic aspects
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Contracts--Economic aspects"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041196> # Industrial efficiency
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Industrial efficiency"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1165603> # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Vertical integration--Mathematical models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/876978> # Contracts--Economic aspects
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009121751> ; # Contracts--Economic aspects
    schema:name "Contracts--Economic aspects"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/970970> # Industrial efficiency
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Industrial efficiency"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/18335502> # Scott Stern
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:birthDate "1969" ;
    schema:familyName "Stern" ;
    schema:givenName "Scott" ;
    schema:name "Scott Stern" ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/77504943> # Sharon Novak
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Novak" ;
    schema:givenName "Sharon" ;
    schema:name "Sharon Novak" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/153303405>
    a genont:InformationResource, genont:ContentTypeGenericResource ;
    schema:about <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> ; # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development
    schema:dateModified "2017-07-08" ;
    void:inDataset <http://purl.oclc.org/dataset/WorldCat> ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Cerrar ventana

Inicie una sesión con WorldCat 

¿No tienes una cuenta? Puede fácilmente crear una cuenta gratuita.