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Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development

Autore: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Editore: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Edizione/Formato:   eBook : Document : EnglishVedi tutte le edizioni e i formati
Banca dati:WorldCat
Sommario:
This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may  Per saperne di più…
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Tipo materiale: Document, Risorsa internet
Tipo documento: Internet Resource, Computer File
Tutti gli autori / Collaboratori: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Numero OCLC: 153303405
Descrizione: 1 online resource (1 v.)
Titolo della serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Responsabilità: Sharon Novak, Scott Stern.

Abstract:

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.

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