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Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development 資料のプレビュー
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Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development

著者: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
出版: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
シリーズ: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
エディション/フォーマット:   電子書籍 : Document : Englishすべてのエディションとフォーマットを見る
データベース:WorldCat
概要:
This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may  続きを読む
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資料の種類: Document, インターネット資料
ドキュメントの種類: インターネットリソース, コンピューターファイル
すべての著者/寄与者: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC No.: 153303405
物理形態: 1 online resource (1 v.)
シリーズタイトル: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
責任者: Sharon Novak, Scott Stern.

概要:

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.

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