doorgaan naar inhoud
Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development Voorbeeldweergave van dit item
SluitenVoorbeeldweergave van dit item
Bezig met controle...

Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development

Auteur: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Uitgever: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Editie/Formaat:   eBoek : Document : EngelsAlle edities en materiaalsoorten bekijken.
Database:WorldCat
Samenvatting:
This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may  Meer lezen...
Beoordeling:

(nog niet beoordeeld) 0 met beoordelingen - U bent de eerste

Onderwerpen
Meer in deze trant

 

Zoeken naar een online exemplaar

Zoeken naar een in de bibliotheek beschikbaar exemplaar

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Bibliotheken met dit item worden gezocht…

Details

Genre: Document, Internetbron
Soort document: Internetbron, Computerbestand
Alle auteurs / medewerkers: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC-nummer: 153303405
Beschrijving: 1 online resource (1 v.)
Serietitel: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
Verantwoordelijkheid: Sharon Novak, Scott Stern.

Fragment:

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.

Beoordelingen

Beoordelingen door gebruikers
Beoordelingen van GoodReads worden opgehaald...
Bezig met opvragen DOGObooks-reviews...

Tags

U bent de eerste.
Bevestig deze aanvraag

Misschien heeft u dit item reeds aangevraagd. Selecteer a.u.b. Ok als u toch wilt doorgaan met deze aanvraag.

Gekoppelde data


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405>
library:oclcnum"153303405"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/153303405>
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1165603>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Vertical integration--Mathematical models"@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:bookFormatschema:EBook
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2007"
schema:description"This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/126516269>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development"@en
schema:publisher
schema:url<http://0-papers.nber.org.biblio.eui.eu/papers/>
schema:url<http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13232>
schema:url

Content-negotiable representations

Venster sluiten

Meld u aan bij WorldCat 

Heeft u geen account? U kunt eenvoudig een nieuwe gratis account aanmaken.