ข้ามไปที่เนือ้หา
Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development แสดงตัวอย่างรายการนี้
ปิดแสดงตัวอย่างรายการนี้
ตรวจสอบ...

Complementarity among vertical integration decisions : evidence from automobile product development

ผู้แต่ง: Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
สำนักพิมพ์: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
ชุด: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
ครั้งที่พิมพ์/รูปแบบ:   หนังสืออีเล็กทรอนิกส์ : เอกสาร : ภาษาอังกฤษดูครั้งที่พิมพ์และรูปแบบ
ฐานข้อมูล:WorldCat
สรุป:
This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may  อ่านมากขึ้น…
คะแนน:

(ยังไม่ให้คะแนน) 0 กับความคิดเห็น - เป็นคนแรก

หัวเรื่อง
เพิ่มเติมเช่นนี้

 

ค้นหาสำเนาออนไลน์

เชื่อมโยงไปยังรายการนี้

ค้นหาสำเนาในห้องสมุด

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; ค้นหาห้องสมุดที่มีรายการนี้

รายละเอียด

ขนิดวัสดุ: เอกสาร, ทรัพยากรอินแทอร์เน็ต
ประเภทของเอกสาร: แหล่งข้อมูลอินเทอร์เน็ต, ไฟล์คอมพิวเตอร์
ผู้แต่งทั้งหมด : ผู้แต่งร่วม Sharon Novak; Scott Stern; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 153303405
คำอธิบาย: 1 online resource (1 volume).
ชื่อชุด: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13232.
ความรับผิดชอบ: Sharon Novak, Scott Stern.

บทคัดย่อ:

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.

รีวิว

ความคิดเห็นผู้ที่ใช้งาน
กำลังค้นคืน รีวิว GoodReads…
ค้นคืน DOGObooks บทวิจารณ์

แท็ก

เป็นคนแรก.

รายการคล้ายกัน

ยืนยันคำขอนี้

คุณอาจะร้องขอรายการนี้แล้. โปรดเลือก ตกลง ถ้าคุณต้องการดำเนินการคำขอนี้ต่อไป.

เชิ่อมโยงข้อมูล


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development
    a schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book, schema:MediaObject ;
    library:oclcnum "153303405" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/876978> ; # Contracts--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009121751> ; # Contracts--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1165603> ; # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Topic/new_products_economic_aspects> ; # New products--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/970970> ; # Industrial efficiency
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041196> ; # Industrial efficiency
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Topic/vertical_integration_mathematical_models> ; # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    schema:about <http://dewey.info/class/330/> ;
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/127108210> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/11541952> ; # Scott Stern
    schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/77504943> ; # Sharon Novak
    schema:datePublished "2007" ;
    schema:description "This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/126516269> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development"@en ;
    schema:productID "153303405" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/153303405#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2007> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
    schema:url <http://0-papers.nber.org.biblio.eui.eu/papers/> ;
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13232> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/153303405> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> ; # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> ; # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/126516269#Topic/vertical_integration_mathematical_models> # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85142912> ;
    schema:name "Vertical integration--Mathematical models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009121751> # Contracts--Economic aspects
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Contracts--Economic aspects"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041196> # Industrial efficiency
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Industrial efficiency"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1165603> # Vertical integration--Mathematical models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Vertical integration--Mathematical models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/876978> # Contracts--Economic aspects
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009121751> ; # Contracts--Economic aspects
    schema:name "Contracts--Economic aspects"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/970970> # Industrial efficiency
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Industrial efficiency"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/11541952> # Scott Stern
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:birthDate "1969" ;
    schema:familyName "Stern" ;
    schema:givenName "Scott" ;
    schema:name "Scott Stern" ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/127108210> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/77504943> # Sharon Novak
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Novak" ;
    schema:givenName "Sharon" ;
    schema:name "Sharon Novak" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/153303405>
    a genont:InformationResource, genont:ContentTypeGenericResource ;
    schema:about <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/153303405> ; # Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development
    schema:dateModified "2015-06-26" ;
    void:inDataset <http://purl.oclc.org/dataset/WorldCat> ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

กรุณาลงชื่อเข้าสู่ระบบ WorldCat 

ยังไม่มีบัญชีผู้ใช้? คุณสามารถสร้างได้อย่างง่ายดาย สร้างบัญชีผู้ใช้ฟรี.