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Congressional parties, institutional ambition, and the financing of majority control

Author: Eric S Heberlig; Bruce A Larson
Publisher: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, ©2012.
Edition/Format:   Book : State or province government publication : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
"With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies. Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson analyze this development and discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They  Read more...
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Material Type: Government publication, State or province government publication, Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Eric S Heberlig; Bruce A Larson
ISBN: 9780472118137 0472118137 9780472035274 0472035274 9780472028238 0472028235
OCLC Number: 759050049
Description: xi, 306 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Contents: Introduction --
Parties, incumbents, and campaign finance in American politics --
Majority status and institutional power --
The growth of member giving --
Brother, can you spare a thousand? Who gives to whom? --
Getting ahead by giving a lot : party goals and advancement in the House --
Leveraging funds to pay for the new party fundraising expectations --
Redistribution and the value of a House career --
Beyond legislating.
Responsibility: Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson.

Abstract:

Fundraising for the party has rapidly replaced more traditional criteria for advancement and other rewards in Congress  Read more...

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"Clearly, the findings and conclusions in this book make a contribution to the study of parties in Congress by expanding our knowledge of the different ways parties exert leverage over legislators. Read more...

 
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