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Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts Titelvorschau
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Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts

Verfasser/in: Michael Tye
Verlag: Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2009.
Serien: Representation and mind series
Ausgabe/Format  Buch : EnglischAlle Ausgaben und Formate anzeigen
Zusammenfassung:

Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting the phenomenal concept strategy.
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Dokumenttyp: Buch
Alle Autoren: Michael Tye
ISBN: 9780262012737 0262012731
OCLC-Nummer: 474110969
Anmerkungen: "A Bradford book.".
Beschreibung: xiv, 229 s. : ill.
Inhalt: Introduction --
Phenomenal consciousness --
Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation --
The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness --
Consciousness of things --
Real world puzzle cases --
Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be --
What is the thesis of physicalism?. Why consciousness cannot be physical --
Why consciousness must be physical --
Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts --
Some terminological points --
Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts --
Various accounts of phenomenal concepts --
My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts --
Are there any phenomenal concepts?. Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions --
Consequences for a priori physicalism --
The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis --
The singular (when filled) thesis --
Kaplanianism --
The multiple contents thesis --
The existential thesis revisited --
Still more on existential contents --
Consciousness, seeing and knowing --
Knowing things and knowing facts --
Nonconceptual content --
Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties --
Phenomenal character and representational content, part I. Phenomenal character and representational content, part II. Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it --
Solving the puzzles --
Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow?. The explanatory gap --
The hard problem --
The possibility of zombies --
Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion --
A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses --
The no-seeum view --
Sperling and the refrigerator light --
Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility --
A further change blindness experiment --
Another brick in the wall --
Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism --
The threat to privileged access --
A Burgean thought experiment --
Social externalism for phenomenal character?. A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility --
How do I know that I am not a zombie?. Phenomenal externalism.
Serientitel: Representation and mind series
Verfasserangabe: Michael Tye.

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"[An] impressive contribution to the study of consciousness...I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the study of consciousness and perception." -- Yaron Senderowicz, Pragmatics and Weiterlesen…

 
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