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Contracting for government services : theory and evidence from U.S. cities

Author: Jonathan Levin; Steve Tadelis; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2007.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 13350.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this "make-or-buy" choice that highlights the trade-off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant  Read more...
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Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Jonathan Levin; Steve Tadelis; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 173618435
Notes: "August 2007."
Description: 29, [12] p. : ill. ; 22 cm.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 13350.
Responsibility: Jonathan Levin, Steven Tadelis.

Abstract:

Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this "make-or-buy" choice that highlights the trade-off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in contracting for government services.

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