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Corruption : a Study in Political Economy.

Author: Susan Rose-Ackerman
Publisher: Burlington : Elsevier Science, 2013.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Rose-Ackerman, Susan.
Corruption : A Study in Political Economy.
Burlington : Elsevier Science, ©2013
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Susan Rose-Ackerman
ISBN: 9781483289069 1483289060
OCLC Number: 898103197
Notes: Corruption.
Description: 1 online resource (279 pages)
Contents: Front Cover; Corruption: A Study in Political Economy; Copyright page; Dedication; Table of Contents; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; Part 1: Introduction; CHAPTER 1. CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL ECONOMY; 1. CORRUPTION AND THE MIXED ECONOMY; 2. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND FUNCTIONAL BRIBERY; 3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT; Part 2: Legislative Corruption; CHAPTER 2. CORRUPTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: THE COST OF INFLUENCE IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC LEGISLATURE; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. CORRUPTION IN A PERFECT DEMOCRATIC STATE; 3. POLITICIANS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION. 4. the structure of interest group organization5. conclusions; appendix 2.1. an example that generates the utility surfaces in figure 2.1; appendix 2.2. competitive bribery in an individualistic legislature; chapter 3. interest group activity and the legislature: corruption, campaign contributions, and lobbying; 1. introduction; 2. ignorance, apathy, and the role of wealth; 3. monopoly power and legislative corruption; 4. interest group resources and organization; 5. conclusions; chapter 4. bureaucratic corruption and the legislative process; 1. introduction; 2. low-level corruption. 3. HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION4. TRADING FAVORS FOR VOTES; 5. POLITICAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT A SEPARATION OF POWERS; 6. CONCLUSIONS: THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL PAYOFFS; APPENDIX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC OUTPUT AND ""RED TAPE""; Part 3: Bureaucratie Corruption; CHAPTER 5. LINING UP AND PAYING OFF; 1. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION: AN OVERVIEW; 2. THE EFFICIENCY OF BRIBERY; 3. SINGLE LINES AND PRIORITY QUEUES; 4. CORRUPTION AND THE RISK OF DETECTION; 5. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX; CHAPTER 6. MONOPOLISTIC BUREAUCRACY; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS. 3. formal models4. policy implications; chapter 7. competitive bureaucracy: corruption in regulatory and social programs; 1. introduction; 2. the basic model; 3. supply and demand functions; 4. the corrupt market; 5. conclusions; appendix; chapter 8. competitive bureaucracy: vagueness, coercion, and market structure; 1. introduction; 2. choosing those who qualify; 3. coercive programs; 4. customers with monopoly power; 5. conclusions; chapter 9. bureaucratic structure and corruption; 1. introduction: four models of bureaucracy; 2. the fragmented and sequential models. 3. THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL4. CHOOSING THE LEAST CORRUPT FORM OF BUREAUCRACY; 5. DISORGANIZED BUREAUCRACIES; 6. CONCLUSIONS; CHAPTER 10. CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. PRIVATE FIRM ORGANIZATION AND CORRUPTION; 3. THE CORRUPTION OF CORPORATE BOARDS AND TOP MANAGERS; 4. MARKET FAILURE AS A CAUSE OF CORRUPTION; 5. CONCLUSIONS: CORRUPT INCENTIVES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS; Part 4: Conclusion; CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND MORALITY; 1. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY; 2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION; 3. MORALITY, CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC THEORY.
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