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Decentralized matching with aligned preferences

Author: Muriel Niederle; Leeat Yariv; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2009.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 14840.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Muriel Niederle; Leeat Yariv; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 318182822
Notes: "April 2009."
Description: 1 online resource (39 pages) : illustrations, digital.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 14840.
Responsibility: Muriel Niederle, Leeat Yariv.

Abstract:

We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.

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