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Deconstructing the mind
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Deconstructing the mind

Author: Stephen P Stich
Publisher: New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.
Series: Philosophy of mind series.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
During the past two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have occupied center-stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. From early childhood onward, we all predict and explain human behavior by invoking mental states like beliefs and desires, but do these familiar states actually exist? A group of prominent philosophers known as eliminativists argues that they do not,
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Details

Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Stephen P Stich
ISBN: 0195100816 9780195100815
OCLC Number: 33245409
Description: viii, 222 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Contents: Deconstructing the mind --
Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology (with William Ramsey and Joseph Garon) --
What is folk psychology? (with Ian Ravenscroft) --
How do minds understand minds? mental simulation versus tacit theory (with Shaun Nichols) --
Intentionality and naturalism (with Stephen Laurence) --
Naturalism, postitivism, and pluralism.
Series Title: Philosophy of mind series.
Responsibility: Stephen P. Stich.
More information:

Abstract:

During the past two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have occupied center-stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. From early childhood onward, we all predict and explain human behavior by invoking mental states like beliefs and desires, but do these familiar states actually exist? A group of prominent philosophers known as eliminativists argues that they do not, contending that commonsense mental states are fictions, products of a tacit and deeply flawed "folk" theory of mind that gives a radically mistaken account of mental life. Recent advances in cognitive science and neuroscience, eliminativists maintain, underscore the shortcomings of commonsense psychology and make it very likely that a mature science of the mind/brain will reject commonsense mental states in much the same way that modern chemistry and physics reject caloric fluid and phlogiston.

In Deconstructing the Mind, distinguished philosopher Stephen Stich, once a leading advocate of eliminativism, offers a bold and compelling reassessment of this view.

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