skip to content
Deregulatory takings and the regulatory contract : the competitive transformation of network industries in the United States Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Deregulatory takings and the regulatory contract : the competitive transformation of network industries in the United States

Author: J Gregory Sidak; Daniel F Spulber
Publisher: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
In this book J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber address deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy, without any offsetting payment of compensation, the value of private property in network industries. They term such policies "deregulatory takings." They further analyze the problem of the state's abrogation of its "regulatory contract" with private firms. They argue that constitutional projections
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

 

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: J Gregory Sidak; Daniel F Spulber
ISBN: 0521591597 9780521591591
OCLC Number: 37369248
Description: xx, 631 pages ; 24 cm
Contents: 1. The Nature of the Controversy --
2. Deregulation and Network Pricing --
3. Quarantines and Quagmires --
4. The Regulatory Contract --
5. Remedies for Breach of the Regulatory Contract --
6. Takings and the Property of the Regulated Utility --
7. Just Compensation for Deregulatory Takings --
8. The Efficient Component-Pricing Rule --
9. The Market-Determined Efficient Component-Pricing Rule --
10. Answering the Critics of Efficient Component Pricing --
11. The Equivalence Principle --
12. TSLRIC Pricing and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs --
13. Deregulatory Takings and Efficient Capital Markets --
14. Limiting Principles for Stranded Cost Recovery --
15. Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries.
Responsibility: J. Gregory Sidak, Daniel F. Spulber.
More information:

Abstract:

In this book J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber address deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy, without any offsetting payment of compensation, the value of private property in network industries. They term such policies "deregulatory takings." They further analyze the problem of the state's abrogation of its "regulatory contract" with private firms. They argue that constitutional projections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for breach of contract, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of network industries. Sidak and Spulber then derive the efficient price for the incumbent regulated firm to charge when the government compels it to sell access to its network to competitors.

That price is the same price that emerges from application of takings jurisprudence and contract principles. Sidak and Spulber produce a comprehensive, coherent theory of "stranded costs," as well as a set of limiting principles for the payment of compensation when changes in government regulation upset settled expectations and harm private investors. Sidak and Spulber reaffirm the superiority of competition over regulation and, on the basis of their conclusions concerning efficient and compensatory pricing of network access, outline principles for deregulating network industries.

This book makes basic theoretical contributions to both law and economics and has immediate relevance to policymakers involved in the competitive restructuring of the telecommunications and electric power industries in the United States and other countries.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/37369248>
library:oclcnum"37369248"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
rdf:typeschema:Book
rdf:typeschema:MediaObject
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1145846>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Right of property."@en
schema:name"Telecommunication--Deregulation"@en
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008110247>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Public utilities--Law and legislation--United States."@en
schema:about
<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102909>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Electric utilities--Law and legislation--United States."@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008112725>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Telecommunication--Law and legislation--United States."@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:contributor
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"1997"
schema:description"In this book J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber address deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy, without any offsetting payment of compensation, the value of private property in network industries. They term such policies "deregulatory takings." They further analyze the problem of the state's abrogation of its "regulatory contract" with private firms. They argue that constitutional projections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for breach of contract, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of network industries. Sidak and Spulber then derive the efficient price for the incumbent regulated firm to charge when the government compels it to sell access to its network to competitors."@en
schema:description"That price is the same price that emerges from application of takings jurisprudence and contract principles. Sidak and Spulber produce a comprehensive, coherent theory of "stranded costs," as well as a set of limiting principles for the payment of compensation when changes in government regulation upset settled expectations and harm private investors. Sidak and Spulber reaffirm the superiority of competition over regulation and, on the basis of their conclusions concerning efficient and compensatory pricing of network access, outline principles for deregulating network industries."@en
schema:description"This book makes basic theoretical contributions to both law and economics and has immediate relevance to policymakers involved in the competitive restructuring of the telecommunications and electric power industries in the United States and other countries."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/806781462>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Deregulatory takings and the regulatory contract : the competitive transformation of network industries in the United States"@en
schema:publication
schema:publisher
schema:workExample
umbel:isLike<http://bnb.data.bl.uk/id/resource/GB9828285>
wdrs:describedby

Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.