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Deterring cybertrespass and securing cyberspace : lessons from United States border control strategies

Author: Mary Manjikian; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute,; Army War College (U.S.). Press,
Publisher: Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, [2016]
Series: Letort papers.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : National government publication : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"Perhaps the best starting point for those looking to 'borrow' a deterrent strategy for cyberspace from other fields is not the example of nuclear deterrence but instead the example of United States-Mexican border security. The nuclear deterrent analogy is not the best fit for understanding cyber-deterrence -- due to the ways in which rewards and payoffs for would-be attackers in cyberspace are different from those  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Online resources
Material Type: Document, Government publication, National government publication, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Mary Manjikian; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute,; Army War College (U.S.). Press,
OCLC Number: 965930596
Notes: "December 2016."
Print version available for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office.
Description: 1 online resource (xiv, 65 pages).
Contents: Three types of criminal deterrent strategies : prevention by design; deterrence by denial; and deterrence by punishment. What can studies of drunk drivers teach us about cyber-deterrence? --
Suggestions for planners --
Why the nuclear analogy is a bad fit. The knowledge problem : attribution, puzzles, and mysteries --
The temporal problem : the iterative nature of cyber-defense --
The learning problem : the payoff of a failed attack --
The populist problem : nuclear deterrence is an elite activity, while cyber-deterrence is not --
Why border deterrence thinking is more applicable than nuclear deterrence thinking. A variety of actors involved in creating and enforcing deterrent strategies --
A variety of different types of trespassers --
We have no strong norms against incursions --
We are fighting a long war against illegal immigration and cyber-incursions --
The (in)effectiveness of using publicity to communicate one's commitment to deterrence --
The problem of asymmetric payoffs : intruders have little incentive not to try again --
We need a strategy and not merely a set of tactics --
Conclusions.
Series Title: Letort papers.
Responsibility: Mary Manjikian.

Abstract:

"Perhaps the best starting point for those looking to 'borrow' a deterrent strategy for cyberspace from other fields is not the example of nuclear deterrence but instead the example of United States-Mexican border security. The nuclear deterrent analogy is not the best fit for understanding cyber-deterrence -- due to the ways in which rewards and payoffs for would-be attackers in cyberspace are different from those in the nuclear analogy -- among other factors. The emphasis here is not on deterrent effects provided by specific weapons but rather on the ways in which human actors understand deterrence and risk in making an attempt to violate a border, and the ways in which security architects can manipulate how would-be aggressors think about these border incursions. This Letort Paper thus borrows from the criminology literature rather than the military-security literature in laying out how individuals may be deterred from committing crimes in real space and in cyberspace through manipulating rewards and punishments. Lessons from attempts at deterring illegal immigration along America's borders are then presented, with lessons derived from those situations, which are helpful in understanding how to deter incursions in cyberspace"--Publisher's web site.

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