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Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases

Author: Laurent Linnemer
Publisher: München : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for economic research, 2008.
Series: CESifo working paper series, 2310.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Economists have emphasized the role of dissipative advertising and price as signals of quality. Most works, however, limit the number of types to two options: high and low quality. Yet, production costs and quality both result from R&D efforts and therefore are both uncertain. I characterize the optimal separating marketing mix (price and advertising) when quality and marginal cost are both subject to chance. In a  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Laurent Linnemer
OCLC Number: 429204986
Description: 1 online resource (Text.)
Series Title: CESifo working paper series, 2310.
Responsibility: Laurent Linnemer.

Abstract:

Economists have emphasized the role of dissipative advertising and price as signals of quality. Most works, however, limit the number of types to two options: high and low quality. Yet, production costs and quality both result from R&D efforts and therefore are both uncertain. I characterize the optimal separating marketing mix (price and advertising) when quality and marginal cost are both subject to chance. In a static framework (no repeat purchases and no informed consumers), advertising appears to be necessary together with price to signal quality. Equilibrium profits depend on cost but not on quality: all rents are dissipated for signaling purpose.

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