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|All Authors / Contributors:||
Pierre-Yves Marot; Muriel Fabre-Magnan; Jean Danet; Université de Nantes. Faculté de droit et des sciences politiques.
|Description:||1 vol. (VIII-666 p.) ; 30 cm.|
|Responsibility:||Pierre-Yves Marot ; sous la dir. de Muriel Fabre-Magnan et de Jean Danet.|
Whereas the primacy of the person is strongly stated by law, the splitting of the, legal sources devoted to the data and information pertaining to the person (personal data. Nominative information, privacy...) is likely to set the dismantling of the person into as many specific legal statuses as there are data and information. The notion of privacy highly participates to this danger because, if its protection means the protection of an important amount of data and information, their nature doesn't indicate what legal status is to be applied in each case. In this context, it is not surprising to see courts allowing the modification of the civil status (names, surnames, sex...) on the paradoxical rationale of the right of privacy, even if it in large parts depends on state decisions. Facing these conceptual contradictions, we note the emergence of a category of personal data and information which as common criterion holds the identification of the person thus allowed. Starting from this functional category, it becomes possible to explore its practical implication and to give an account of it. As it appears, if the use of personal data and information remains exceptional, it becomes massive as soon as public interest are concerned (e.g. penal system, public health and public information). It is therefore advised to restore in all, its fullness. The principle of protection for personal data and information by strictly appreciating its exemptions and by relying on the necessary safeguard unavailability provides.