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Efficient regulation

Author: Andrei Shleifer; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2010.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 15651.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Regulation of economic activity is ubiquitous around the world, yet standard theories predict it should be rather uncommon. I argue that the ubiquity of regulation is explained not so much by the failure of markets, or by asymmetric information, as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. The approach accounts for the ubiquity of regulation, for its growth  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Andrei Shleifer; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 500845021
Notes: "January 2010."
Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/w15651 viewed Jan. 19, 2010.
Description: 1 online resource (27 pages).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 15651.
Responsibility: Andrei Shleifer.

Abstract:

Regulation of economic activity is ubiquitous around the world, yet standard theories predict it should be rather uncommon. I argue that the ubiquity of regulation is explained not so much by the failure of markets, or by asymmetric information, as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. The approach accounts for the ubiquity of regulation, for its growth over time, as well as for the fact that contracts themselves are heavily regulated. It also makes predictions, both across activities and across jurisdictions, for the efficiency of regulation and litigation as strategies of enforcing efficient conduct.

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