skip to content
Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis

Author: Philip Keefer; World Bank.
Publisher: [Washington, D.C] : World Bank, 2004.
Series: Policy research working paper, 3439; World Bank E-Library Archive
Edition/Format:   Computer file : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
"Keefer proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

 

Find a copy online

Links to this item

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Philip Keefer; World Bank.
OCLC Number: 874232782
Notes: Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2004].
Description: 1 online resource.
Series Title: Policy research working paper, 3439; World Bank E-Library Archive
Responsibility: Philip Keefer.

Abstract:

"Keefer proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less important are exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient prevention and resolution of financial crisis. This paper--a product of the Growth and Investment Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the political economy of good policy"--World Bank web site.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/874232782> # Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
    a schema:CreativeWork, bgn:ComputerFile ;
    library:oclcnum "874232782" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/xxu> ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Place/washington_d_c> ; # Washington, D.C
    schema:contributor <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Organization/world_bank> ; # World Bank.
    schema:creator <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Person/keefer_philip> ; # Philip Keefer
    schema:datePublished "2004" ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/17119005> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Series/world_bank_e_library_archive> ; # World Bank E-Library Archive,
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Series/policy_research_working_paper> ; # Policy research working paper ;
    schema:name "Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis" ;
    schema:productID "874232782" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/874232782#PublicationEvent/washington_d_c_world_bank_2004> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Agent/world_bank> ; # World Bank
    schema:reviews <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/874232782#Review/-1223111181> ;
    schema:url <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3439> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/874232782> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Person/keefer_philip> # Philip Keefer
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Keefer" ;
    schema:givenName "Philip" ;
    schema:name "Philip Keefer" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Place/washington_d_c> # Washington, D.C
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Washington, D.C" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Series/policy_research_working_paper> # Policy research working paper ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/874232782> ; # Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
    schema:name "Policy research working paper ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/17119005#Series/world_bank_e_library_archive> # World Bank E-Library Archive,
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/874232782> ; # Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
    schema:name "World Bank E-Library Archive," ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/874232782#Review/-1223111181>
    a schema:Review ;
    schema:itemReviewed <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/874232782> ; # Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
    schema:reviewBody ""Keefer proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less important are exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient prevention and resolution of financial crisis. This paper--a product of the Growth and Investment Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the political economy of good policy"--World Bank web site." ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.