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Enforcing intellectual property rights

Author: Jean Olson Lanjouw; Mark Schankerman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, MA. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2001.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 8656.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Abstract: We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978-1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is very heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Jean Olson Lanjouw; Mark Schankerman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 49047016
Notes: "December 2001."
Description: 1 online resource (44 pages).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 8656.
Responsibility: Jean O. Lanjouw, Mark Schankerman.

Abstract:

Abstract: We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978-1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is very heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage 'cooperative' interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation insurance to mitigate this adverse affect of high enforcement costs.

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