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Engineering disasters : lessons to be learned

Author: Don Lawson
Publisher: New York : ASME Press, 2005.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
In this practical and highly topical book, the author provides thoroughly researched accounts of well-known disasters and failures worldwide. Historical events such as the Hindenburg Disaster and Chernobyl are covered, as well as more recent occurrences, such as the World Trade Center and Columbia Space Shuttle disasters. The author provides valuable interpretive sections, revealing the lessons to be learned in each  Read more...
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Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Don Lawson
ISBN: 0791802302 9780791802304
OCLC Number: 57353043
Notes: "ASME order number: 802302"--Title page verso.
Description: xxii, 399 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Contents: The Hindenburg Disaster --
hydrogen myth? --
The disaster --
Airship history --
Why were airships popular? --
The impact of world events and the political climate --
The key players --
The US investigation --
The Department of Commerce Report --
The role of the FBI --
The German investigation --
New developments in the 1900s --
Is this the end of the story? --
Some loose ends --
UK Railway Woes --
What's wrong --
The early history of British railways --
Railways in the first half of the twentieth century --
Safety, risk, and regulation --
Nationalization 1947 --
Privatiziation --
Signals passed at danger (SPADs) --
Accidents --
road versus rail --
History --
Accidents at Clapham (1988), Southall (1997), and Ladbroke Grove (1999) --
What are ATP, ERTMS, ETCS, and GSM-R? --
The plan foward --
What has to be done? --
Som statistical data --
The safety case vewrsus commercial costs --
Cost/benefit --
Experience with TPWS --
Lessons learned to date --
The Wheel/Rail Interface --
The rail as a beam --
Local contact stresses --
Vehicle dynamics --
Shakedownm theory --
Crack propagation --
Fracture mechanics --
What limits rail life? --
Lubrication --
Wheel/rail profiles --
Metallurgy --
Inspection --
Experience on rail systems around the world --
Uskmouth Turbine Failure --
The failure --
Circumstances surrounding the future --
What should happened? --
The investigation --
The technical paper and discussion --
Dr. Richard Faynman and the Challenger Shuttle Inquiry --
The Presidential Comissioned --
Dr. Richard Feynman (1918-1988) --
Culture clash --
The working methods of the Comission --
The Space Shuttle and its solid booster rockets --
The SBR field joints --
Putty --
Seal tesst pressure --
Anomalies and erosion --
Preparation for the launch --
Raising concerns about low temperature --
Accident sequence --
Dr. Feynman at the inquiry --
Dr. Feynman and Roger Boisjoly --
Figures of fantasy --
Dr. Feynman and the report writing --
The recommendations --
Dr. Feynman's afterthoughts --
Lessons from the US Space Program --
Technical and administrative management --
The funding trap --
Aggregate risk --
Achieving adequate safety levels --
Some of the small issues that can have a large impact --
Software computer --
Columbia --
deja vu --
The investigation board --
The physical cause of the disaster --
The debris --
The bipod and its foam insulation --
Shuttle damage --
Statisitics --
Mission Management's role in the disaster --
Attitude to foamshedding prior to this mission --
The photographic record --
The engineers' assessment of the damage --
Crater --
a tool outside its range --
Presentation of engineering analysis to Mission Management --
Mission Management's view and review of engineering input --
Request for photographs --
Mission Management meetings --
Message to the crew --
Management view post-disater --
CAIB's summary of managemtn decisions --
Organizational flaws --
Budget and staff cuts --
Management of NASA --
Schedule pressure --
Previous investigations, reviews, and reports --
Safety organization --
Safety culture --
Can-do culture --
Engineering practices --
Challenger and Coumbia similar disasters? --
Insights from organizational theory --
Insights from experience in other high tech, high risk industries --
Discussions with Dr. Diane Vaughan --
Caib's summary of organizational issues --
Other facts and issues --
Roll-on/Roll-off Ferries --
are they safe enough? --
History of ro-ro ships --
Accidents --
Herald of Free Enterprise --
Basic safety principles --
How do ro-ro ships meet these safety steps? --
Who calls the tune? --
Regulations and regulators --
Technical developments --
Actions by some other countries outside the Stockholm Agreement --
Maximum wave --
Bridges too far? --
Bridge failures --
Status of bridges in the United States --
The strange case of the bridge at Ynysygwas --
A selction of landmark bridge failures --
Comments on bridges in general --
The De Havilland Comet Accidents --
Geoffrey de Havilland (1882-1965) --
Origins of the Comet airliner --
The design of DH106 --
Comet --
Pressure cabin design --
Fatigue testing to confirm design --
Operational experience --
The accidnet investigation --
RAE --
The fatique results from service and test --
De Havilland versus RAE --
The danger of not knowing --
Example 1. the Gimli glider --
Example 2. the day the Azores were in the right place --
Chernobyl Disaster --
Science in Russia --
A good fit --
niclear power and communism --
Choosing the reactor for power generation --
Competition during the Cold War --
Fast expansion of the nuclear programme --
The RBMK reactor --
The test plan --
Events leading up to the test --
The accident --
Why did the power surge? --
Role of Valeri Legasov --
Role of Evgeny Velikhov --
Aftermath of the accident --
Radiation hazards --
are engineers failing the public? --
Radiation safety standards and regulation --
Data from the atomic bomb survivors --
Challenges to the radiation regulations --
Sources of radiation from nature and man-made sources --
Low dose radiation models --
Epidemiology --
DNA damage --
Study of hormesis and other work at low doses --
Effects of radiation from Chernobyl --
Words of Wisdom --
Sir Alfred Pugsley (1903-1998) --
Alfred M. Freudenthal (1906-1977) --
Henry Petroski --
Trevor Kletz --
Hyman G. Rickover (1898 or 1900 [uncertainty] --
1986) --
Placing engineering into perspective --
Science and engineering --
What is an engineer? --
Cycles in engineering --
Does history matter? --
Learning from the military --
Maintenance holiday --
a familiar story --
Organizations aiming to reduse risk --
worth broader exposure --
Peer reviews --
INPO and WANO --
Standing Committee on Structural Safety (SCOSS)) --
The Hazards Forum --
Technical aspects of failure --
The problem of failure --
Robustness --
From fatigue to structural integrity --
The Human approach to risk, decisions and errors --
Dealing with risk --
Human decisions and errors --
Normal accidents versus High Reliability Theory --
An engineer's personal story worth repeating --
What does it feel like to be associated with a disaster? --
Drawing the threads together --
Is there a pattern to the failure? --
The three spheres of failure initiation --
The nature of disasters --
What are the common reasons for failures --
Why do failures occur? --
THe role of design --
Organizational weakness --
What do the public want? --
Making better decisions --
The last words.
Responsibility: Don Lawson.

Abstract:

In this practical and highly topical book, the author provides thoroughly researched accounts of well-known disasters and failures worldwide. Historical events such as the Hindenburg Disaster and Chernobyl are covered, as well as more recent occurrences, such as the World Trade Center and Columbia Space Shuttle disasters. The author provides valuable interpretive sections, revealing the lessons to be learned in each case. Examples are included from a wide range of industries, as well as background information and views from several known experts in the field. The author discusses the common threads and conclusions from accident investigations and offers excellent references for further study.

Table of Contents:

by christinenelson3 (WorldCat user on 2006-10-17)

Pt. 1. The Hindenburg disaster: hydrogen myth? -- UK railway woes -- Signals passed at danger (SPADs) -- The wheel/rail interface -- Uskmouth turbine failure -- Dr. Richard Feynman and the Challenger Shuttle inquiry -- Lessons from the US space program -- Columbia, deja vu? -- Roll-on/roll-off ferries: are they safe enough? -- Bridges too far? -- The De Havilland comet accidents -- The danger of not knowing -- Chernobyl disaster -- Radiation hazards: are engineers failing the public? -- Pt. 2. Words of wisdom -- Background: placing engineering into perspective -- Organizations aiming to reduce risk: worth broader exposure -- Technical aspects of failure -- The human approach to risk, decisions, and errors -- An engineer's personal story worth repeating -- Pt. 3. Drawing the threads together -- The role of design -- Organizational weaknesses -- What do the public want -- Making better decisions -- The last words!

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schema:description"The Hindenburg Disaster -- hydrogen myth? -- The disaster -- Airship history -- Why were airships popular? -- The impact of world events and the political climate -- The key players -- The US investigation -- The Department of Commerce Report -- The role of the FBI -- The German investigation -- New developments in the 1900s -- Is this the end of the story? -- Some loose ends -- UK Railway Woes -- What's wrong -- The early history of British railways -- Railways in the first half of the twentieth century -- Safety, risk, and regulation -- Nationalization 1947 -- Privatiziation -- Signals passed at danger (SPADs) -- Accidents -- road versus rail -- History -- Accidents at Clapham (1988), Southall (1997), and Ladbroke Grove (1999) -- What are ATP, ERTMS, ETCS, and GSM-R? -- The plan foward -- What has to be done? -- Som statistical data -- The safety case vewrsus commercial costs -- Cost/benefit -- Experience with TPWS -- Lessons learned to date -- The Wheel/Rail Interface -- The rail as a beam -- Local contact stresses -- Vehicle dynamics -- Shakedownm theory -- Crack propagation -- Fracture mechanics -- What limits rail life? -- Lubrication -- Wheel/rail profiles -- Metallurgy -- Inspection -- Experience on rail systems around the world -- Uskmouth Turbine Failure -- The failure -- Circumstances surrounding the future -- What should happened? -- The investigation -- The technical paper and discussion -- Dr. Richard Faynman and the Challenger Shuttle Inquiry -- The Presidential Comissioned -- Dr. Richard Feynman (1918-1988) -- Culture clash -- The working methods of the Comission -- The Space Shuttle and its solid booster rockets -- The SBR field joints -- Putty -- Seal tesst pressure -- Anomalies and erosion -- Preparation for the launch -- Raising concerns about low temperature -- Accident sequence -- Dr. Feynman at the inquiry -- Dr. Feynman and Roger Boisjoly -- Figures of fantasy -- Dr. Feynman and the report writing -- The recommendations -- Dr. Feynman's afterthoughts -- Lessons from the US Space Program -- Technical and administrative management -- The funding trap -- Aggregate risk -- Achieving adequate safety levels -- Some of the small issues that can have a large impact -- Software computer -- Columbia -- deja vu -- The investigation board -- The physical cause of the disaster -- The debris -- The bipod and its foam insulation -- Shuttle damage -- Statisitics -- Mission Management's role in the disaster -- Attitude to foamshedding prior to this mission -- The photographic record -- The engineers' assessment of the damage -- Crater -- a tool outside its range -- Presentation of engineering analysis to Mission Management -- Mission Management's view and review of engineering input -- Request for photographs -- Mission Management meetings -- Message to the crew -- Management view post-disater -- CAIB's summary of managemtn decisions -- Organizational flaws -- Budget and staff cuts -- Management of NASA -- Schedule pressure -- Previous investigations, reviews, and reports -- Safety organization -- Safety culture -- Can-do culture -- Engineering practices -- Challenger and Coumbia similar disasters? -- Insights from organizational theory -- Insights from experience in other high tech, high risk industries -- Discussions with Dr. Diane Vaughan -- Caib's summary of organizational issues -- Other facts and issues -- Roll-on/Roll-off Ferries -- are they safe enough? -- History of ro-ro ships -- Accidents -- Herald of Free Enterprise -- Basic safety principles -- How do ro-ro ships meet these safety steps? -- Who calls the tune? -- Regulations and regulators -- Technical developments -- Actions by some other countries outside the Stockholm Agreement -- Maximum wave -- Bridges too far? -- Bridge failures -- Status of bridges in the United States -- The strange case of the bridge at Ynysygwas -- A selction of landmark bridge failures -- Comments on bridges in general -- The De Havilland Comet Accidents -- Geoffrey de Havilland (1882-1965) -- Origins of the Comet airliner -- The design of DH106 -- Comet -- Pressure cabin design -- Fatigue testing to confirm design -- Operational experience -- The accidnet investigation -- RAE -- The fatique results from service and test -- De Havilland versus RAE -- The danger of not knowing -- Example 1. the Gimli glider -- Example 2. the day the Azores were in the right place -- Chernobyl Disaster -- Science in Russia -- A good fit -- niclear power and communism -- Choosing the reactor for power generation -- Competition during the Cold War -- Fast expansion of the nuclear programme -- The RBMK reactor -- The test plan -- Events leading up to the test -- The accident -- Why did the power surge? -- Role of Valeri Legasov -- Role of Evgeny Velikhov -- Aftermath of the accident -- Radiation hazards -- are engineers failing the public? -- Radiation safety standards and regulation -- Data from the atomic bomb survivors -- Challenges to the radiation regulations -- Sources of radiation from nature and man-made sources -- Low dose radiation models -- Epidemiology -- DNA damage -- Study of hormesis and other work at low doses -- Effects of radiation from Chernobyl -- Words of Wisdom -- Sir Alfred Pugsley (1903-1998) -- Alfred M. Freudenthal (1906-1977) -- Henry Petroski -- Trevor Kletz -- Hyman G. Rickover (1898 or 1900 [uncertainty] -- 1986) -- Placing engineering into perspective -- Science and engineering -- What is an engineer? -- Cycles in engineering -- Does history matter? -- Learning from the military -- Maintenance holiday -- a familiar story -- Organizations aiming to reduse risk -- worth broader exposure -- Peer reviews -- INPO and WANO -- Standing Committee on Structural Safety (SCOSS)) -- The Hazards Forum -- Technical aspects of failure -- The problem of failure -- Robustness -- From fatigue to structural integrity -- The Human approach to risk, decisions and errors -- Dealing with risk -- Human decisions and errors -- Normal accidents versus High Reliability Theory -- An engineer's personal story worth repeating -- What does it feel like to be associated with a disaster? -- Drawing the threads together -- Is there a pattern to the failure? -- The three spheres of failure initiation -- The nature of disasters -- What are the common reasons for failures -- Why do failures occur? -- THe role of design -- Organizational weakness -- What do the public want? -- Making better decisions -- The last words."@en
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