详细书目
| 材料类型: | 硕士论文/博士论文, 手稿 |
|---|---|
| 文件类型: | 书, 档案资料 |
| 所有的著者/提供者: |
Timothy Paul Blumentritt |
| OCLC号码: | 42669562 |
| 注意: | Typescript. |
| 描述: | ix, 220 leaves : ill. ; 28 cm. |
| 责任: | by Timothy Paul Blumentritt. |
摘要:
By focusing on foreign subsidiaries, this study taps into some interesting aspects of MNCs. First, MNCs are complex organizations with subsidiaries of different sizes and purposes. Second, each country in which a MNC conducts operations through a subsidiaries presents a different political environment. By noting that MNCs are made up of many types of subsidiaries doing business in many different country environments, the idea that the subsidiaries of even the same MNC will interact with their host governments in many ways is evident.
A bargaining power model is used as a guide to the inclusion of variables and construction of hypotheses. However, instead of the outcome variables of firm/government interactions used by most bargaining power studies, this study concentrates on the intermediate constructs of subsidiary government affairs activities. Subsidiary government affairs activities are comprised of government affairs strategies, the means of interacting with governments, as well as government affairs structures, the amount and form of resources dedicated to the administration of government affairs activities. The bargaining power model suggests that two sets of variables should be useful in explaining the government affairs activities of subsidiaries. First, characteristics of the subsidiary itself are considered. Second, characteristics of the countries in which the subsidiaries conduct operations are considered.
The dissertation's hypotheses were tested using two sets of data. First, primary information was gathered from foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based MNCs in a single industry through a survey of their top managers. The survey procedure netted a response rate of over 33% and yielded 91 usable responses. Second, secondary data was gathered on the host countries in which the responding subsidiaries are located. A primary finding of the empirical test was the discovery of a strong managerial influence on foreign subsidiary government affairs activities, while previous bargaining power studies have concentrated on firm resources as predictors variables.
