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Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy

Author: Peter N Ireland; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, MA. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©1999.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 7234.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of multiple equilibria in a model of time-consistent monetary policy. It suggests that this problem originates in the assumption that agents have rational expectations and proposes several alternative restrictions on expectations that allow the monetary authority to build credibility for a disinflationary policy by demonstrating that it will stick to the policy even if it  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Peter N Ireland; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 70121392
Notes: "July 1999."
Description: 1 online resource (39 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 7234.
Responsibility: Peter N. Ireland.

Abstract:

Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of multiple equilibria in a model of time-consistent monetary policy. It suggests that this problem originates in the assumption that agents have rational expectations and proposes several alternative restrictions on expectations that allow the monetary authority to build credibility for a disinflationary policy by demonstrating that it will stick to the policy even if it imposes short-run costs on the economy. Starting with these restrictions, the paper derives conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the model's steady state; monetary policy in this unique steady state involves the constant deflation advocated by Milton Friedman.

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