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Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances

Author: Demet Çetiner
Publisher: Berlin ; New York : Springer, ©2013.
Dissertation: Diss.-- University of Duisburg-Essen, 2012.
Series: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 668.
Edition/Format:   Thesis/dissertation : Document : Thesis/dissertation : eBook   Computer File : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Material Type: Document, Thesis/dissertation, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Demet Çetiner
ISBN: 9783642358227 3642358225
OCLC Number: 839437102
Description: 1 online resource.
Contents: Introduction --
Selected Topics in Revenue Management --
A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances --
Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory --
Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game --
Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances --
Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances --
A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices --
Conclusions and Future Research.
Series Title: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 668.
Responsibility: Demet Çetiner.
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Abstract:

This book examines fair revenue proportions for airline alliances. It looks at the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly, and develops a new selfish  Read more...

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