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Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances

Autor Demet Çetiner
Vydavatel: Berlin ; New York : Springer, ©2013.
Dizertace: Diss.-- University of Duisburg-Essen, 2012.
Edice: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 668.
Vydání/formát:   Kvalifikační práce : Document : Thesis/dissertation : e-kniha   Computer File : EnglishZobrazit všechny vydání a formáty
Databáze:WorldCat
Shrnutí:
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision  Přečíst více...
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Detaily

Žánr/forma: Electronic books
Typ materiálu: Document, Thesis/dissertation, Internetový zdroj
Typ dokumentu: Internet Resource, Computer File
Všichni autoři/tvůrci: Demet Çetiner
ISBN: 9783642358227 3642358225 3642358217 9783642358210
OCLC číslo: 839437102
Popis: 1 online resource.
Obsahy: Introduction --
Selected Topics in Revenue Management --
A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances --
Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory --
Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game --
Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances --
Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances --
A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices --
Conclusions and Future Research.
Název edice: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 668.
Odpovědnost: Demet Çetiner.

Anotace:

This book examines fair revenue proportions for airline alliances. It looks at the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly, and develops a new selfish  Přečíst více...

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