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Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances

Auteur: Demet Çetiner
Uitgever: Berlin ; New York : Springer, ©2013.
Proefschrift: Diss.-- University of Duisburg-Essen, 2012.
Serie: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 668.
Editie/Formaat:   Scriptie/Proefschrift : Document : Scriptie/Dissertatie : e-Boek   Computerbestand : EngelsAlle edities en materiaalsoorten bekijken.
Database:WorldCat
Samenvatting:
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision  Meer lezen...
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Details

Genre/Vorm: Electronic books
Genre: Document, Scriptie/Dissertatie, Internetbron
Soort document: Internetbron, Computerbestand
Alle auteurs / medewerkers: Demet Çetiner
ISBN: 9783642358227 3642358225 3642358217 9783642358210
OCLC-nummer: 839437102
Beschrijving: 1 online resource.
Inhoud: Introduction --
Selected Topics in Revenue Management --
A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances --
Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory --
Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game --
Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances --
Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances --
A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices --
Conclusions and Future Research.
Serietitel: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 668.
Verantwoordelijkheid: Demet Çetiner.

Fragment:

This book examines fair revenue proportions for airline alliances. It looks at the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly, and develops a new selfish  Meer lezen...

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