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Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger Airline Alliances

Author: Demet Çetiner
Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2013.
Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 668
Edition/Format:   Computer file : English
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision  Read more...
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Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Demet Çetiner
ISBN: 9783642358227 3642358225
OCLC Number: 927817514
Description: 1 online resource (1 libor electrónico (168 p.).)
Contents: Introduction --
Selected Topics in Revenue Management --
A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances --
Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory --
Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game --
Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances --
Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances --
A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices --
Conclusion and Future Research --
Appendix: Computational Study.
Series Title: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 668
Responsibility: by Demet Çetiner.

Abstract:

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

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