skip to content
Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy

Author: Marina Halac; Pierre Yared; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 21492.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare centralized rules -- chosen jointly by all countries -- to decentralized rules. If governments' present bias is small, centralized rules are tighter than decentralized rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Links to this item

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Marina Halac; Pierre Yared; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 922049066
Notes: "This paper was revised on September 9, 2015."--HTML article page.
"August 2015"
Description: 1 online resource (49 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 21492.
Responsibility: Marina Halac, Pierre Yared.

Abstract:

Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare centralized rules -- chosen jointly by all countries -- to decentralized rules. If governments' present bias is small, centralized rules are tighter than decentralized rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, centralized rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits and money burning enhance welfare, and inefficiencies arise if some countries adopt stricter rules than imposed centrally.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/922049066> # Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy
    a schema:MediaObject, schema:Book, schema:CreativeWork ;
   library:oclcnum "922049066" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Topic/fiscal_policy_econometric_models> ; # Fiscal policy--Econometric models
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Topic/government_spending_policy_econometric_models> ; # Government spending policy--Econometric models
   schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Person/yared_pierre> ; # Pierre Yared
   schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Person/halac_marina> ; # Marina Halac
   schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
   schema:datePublished "2015" ;
   schema:description "Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare centralized rules -- chosen jointly by all countries -- to decentralized rules. If governments' present bias is small, centralized rules are tighter than decentralized rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, centralized rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits and money burning enhance welfare, and inefficiencies arise if some countries adopt stricter rules than imposed centrally."@en ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/2604236454> ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
   schema:name "Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy"@en ;
   schema:productID "922049066" ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research,
   schema:url <http://www.nber.org/papers/w21492> ;
   schema:url <http://www.nber.org/papers/w21492.pdf> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/922049066> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    a schema:Organization ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research," ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Person/halac_marina> # Marina Halac
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Halac" ;
   schema:givenName "Marina" ;
   schema:name "Marina Halac" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Person/yared_pierre> # Pierre Yared
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Yared" ;
   schema:givenName "Pierre" ;
   schema:name "Pierre Yared" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/922049066> ; # Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy
   schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/922049066> ; # Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy
   schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Topic/fiscal_policy_econometric_models> # Fiscal policy--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Fiscal policy--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/2604236454#Topic/government_spending_policy_econometric_models> # Government spending policy--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Government spending policy--Econometric models"@en ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.