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Funding scientific knowledge : selection, disclosure and the public-private portfolio

作者: Joshua Gans; Fiona E S Murray; National Bureau of Economic Research.
出版商: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2011.
叢書: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 16980.
版本/格式:   電子書 : 文獻 : 英語所有版本和格式的總覽
資料庫:WorldCat
提要:
This paper examines argues that while two distinct perspectives characterize the foundations of the public funding of research -- filling a selection gap and solving a disclosure problem -- in fact both the selection choices of public funders and their criteria for disclosure and commercialization shape the level and type of funding for research and the disclosures that arise as a consequence. In making our  再讀一些...
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資料類型: 文獻, 網際網路資源
文件類型: 網路資源, 電腦資料
所有的作者/貢獻者: Joshua Gans; Fiona E S Murray; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC系統控制編碼: 719368883
注意: "April 2011."
Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/16980 viewed May 2, 2011.
描述: 1 online resource (69 p.) : ill.
叢書名: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 16980.
責任: Joshua Gans, Fiona E. Murray.

摘要:

This paper examines argues that while two distinct perspectives characterize the foundations of the public funding of research -- filling a selection gap and solving a disclosure problem -- in fact both the selection choices of public funders and their criteria for disclosure and commercialization shape the level and type of funding for research and the disclosures that arise as a consequence. In making our argument, we begin by reviewing project selection criteria and policies towards disclosure and commercialization (including patent rights) made by major funding organizations, noting the great variation between these institutions. We then provide a model of how selection criteria and funding conditions imposed by funders interact with the preferences of scientists to shape those projects that accept public funds and the overall level of openness in research. Our analysis reveals complex and unexpected relationships between public funding, private funding, and public disclosure of research. We show, for example, that funding choices made by public agencies can lead to unintended, paradoxical effects, providing short-term openness while stifling longer-term innovation. Implications for empirical evaluation and an agenda for future research are discussed.

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