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Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas

Author: Laobing Zhang; Genserik L L Reniers
Publisher: Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2018] ©2018
Series: Advanced sciences and technologies for security applications.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries.The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: (OCoLC)1032575979
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Laobing Zhang; Genserik L L Reniers
ISBN: 9783319926186 3319926187 3319926179 9783319926179
OCLC Number: 1043831078
Description: 1 online resource.
Contents: Intro; Introduction; Reference; Contents; List of Figures; Chapter 1: Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: The State of the Art; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Safety and Security Definitions and Differences; 1.3 Security in a Single Chemical Plant; 1.3.1 The Need of Improving Security in Chemical Plants; 1.3.2 Challenges with Respect to Improving Chemical Security; 1.3.3 Security Risk Assessment in Chemical Plants: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.3.4 Drawbacks of Current Methodologies; 1.4 Protection of Chemical Industrial Parks (CIPs) or So-Called Chemical Clusters 1.4.1 Security Within Chemical Clusters1.4.2 Chemical Cluster Security: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.4.3 Future Promising Research Directions on Cluster Security; 1.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 2: Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory; 2.1 Preliminaries of Game Theory, Setting the Scene; 2.1.1 Introduction; 2.1.2 Players; 2.1.3 Strategy (Set); 2.1.4 Payoff; 2.1.5 The Assumption of `Common Knowledge;́ 2.1.6 The Assumption of `Rationality;́ 2.1.7 Simultaneous and Sequential Game; 2.2 Game Theoretic Models with a Discrete Set of Strategies 2.2.1 Discrete and Continuous Set of Strategies2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium; 2.2.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 2.3 Criticisms on Game Theoretic Models for Security Improvement; 2.4 Integrating Conventional Security Risk Assessment Methodologies and Game Theory for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 2.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 3.1 General Intrusion Detection Approach in Chemical Plants; 3.2 Game-Theoretical Modelling: The Chemical Plant Protection Game (CPP Game); 3.2.1 Players; 3.2.2 Strategies 3.2.3 Payoffs3.3 Solutions for the CPP Game; 3.3.1 Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.4 CPP Game from an Industrial Practice Point of View; 3.4.1 Input Analysis; 3.4.2 Output Analysis; 3.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 4: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-Free Uncertainties; 4.1 Motivation; 4.2 Interval CPP Game Definition; 4.3 Interval Bi-Matrix Game Solver (IBGS); 4.4 Parameter Coupling; 4.5 Interval CPP Game Solver (ICGS); 4.6 Conclusion; References Chapter 5: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game Involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality5.1 Motivation; 5.2 Epsilon-Optimal Attacker; 5.2.1 Definition of an `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.2 Game Modelling of the `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.3 Solving the CPP Game with `Epsilon-Optimal Attackers;́ 5.3 Monotonic Optimal Attacker; 5.3.1 Definition of a `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.2 Game Modelling of the `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.3 Calculating the MoSICP; 5.4 MiniMax Attacker; 5.4.1 Definition of a `MiniMax Attackeŕ
Series Title: Advanced sciences and technologies for security applications.
Responsibility: Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers.

Abstract:

This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential  Read more...

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