skip to content
A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice

Author: Estelle Cantillon; Antonio Rangel; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, MA. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2001.
Series: NBER technical working paper, no. 268.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Abstract: We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Estelle Cantillon; Antonio Rangel; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 60340677
Description: 1 online resource (29 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: NBER technical working paper, no. 268.
Responsibility: Estelle Cantillon, Antonio Rangel.

Abstract:

Abstract: We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.

Similar Items

Related Subjects:(2)

Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/60340677> # A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
    a schema:Book, schema:MediaObject, schema:CreativeWork ;
   library:oclcnum "60340677" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20633631#Place/cambridge_ma> ; # Cambridge, MA.
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1006241> ; # Majorities
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1122336> ; # Social choice
   schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/57743843> ; # Antonio Rangel
   schema:copyrightYear "2001" ;
   schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/33132460> ; # Estelle Cantillon
   schema:datePublished "2001" ;
   schema:description "Abstract: We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem."@en ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/20633631> ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20633631#Series/nber_technical_working_paper> ; # NBER technical working paper ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20633631#Series/technical_working_papers> ; # Technical working papers ;
   schema:name "A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice"@en ;
   schema:productID "60340677" ;
   schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/60340677#PublicationEvent/cambridge_ma_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2001> ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20633631#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
   schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/t0268> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/60340677> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20633631#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20633631#Series/nber_technical_working_paper> # NBER technical working paper ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/60340677> ; # A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
   schema:name "NBER technical working paper ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20633631#Series/technical_working_papers> # Technical working papers ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/60340677> ; # A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
   schema:name "Technical working papers ;" ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1006241> # Majorities
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Majorities"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1122336> # Social choice
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Social choice"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/33132460> # Estelle Cantillon
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Cantillon" ;
   schema:givenName "Estelle" ;
   schema:name "Estelle Cantillon" ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/57743843> # Antonio Rangel
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Rangel" ;
   schema:givenName "Antonio" ;
   schema:name "Antonio Rangel" ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.