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How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies?

Author: Torsten Persson; Gérard Roland; Guido Enrico Tabellini; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2003.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10176.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Torsten Persson; Gérard Roland; Guido Enrico Tabellini; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 54666177
Notes: "December 2003."
Description: 1 online resource (54, [6] pages).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10176.
Responsibility: Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, Guido Tabellini.

Abstract:

"We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending"--NBER website.

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