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How things might have been : individuals, kinds, and essential properties
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How things might have been : individuals, kinds, and essential properties

Author: Penelope Mackie
Publisher: Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Published in the United States by Oxford University Press, 2006.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"How are we to distinguish between the essential and accidental properties of things such as individual people, cats, trees, and tables? Almost everyone agrees that such individuals could have been different, in certain respects, from the way that they actually are. But what are the respects in which they could not have been different: which of their properties are essential to their being the individuals that they
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Additional Physical Format: Online version:
Mackie, Penelope.
How things might have been.
Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Published in the United States by Oxford University Press, 2006
(OCoLC)654535861
Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Penelope Mackie
ISBN: 0199272204 9780199272204
OCLC Number: 65406908
Description: xii, 212 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Contents: Individual essences and bare identities --
Origin properties and individual essences --
Extrinsically determined identity and 'best-candidate' theories --
Counterpart theory and the puzzles of transworld identity --
The necessity of origin --
Sortal concepts and essential properties I : substance sortals and essential sortals --
Sortal concepts and essential propeties II : sortal concepts and principles of individuation --
Essential properties and remote contingencies --
Essentialism, semantic theory, and natural kinds.
Responsibility: Penelope Mackie.
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Abstract:

Discusses the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. The author challenges widely held views, and arrives at 'minimalist essentialism'- an unorthodox theory  Read more...

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...one of the clearest and fullest discussions of contemporary essentialism that has appeared for quite some time. E. J. Lowe, Mind Journal ...How Things Might Have Been consists of a wonderfully Read more...

 
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schema:reviewBody""How are we to distinguish between the essential and accidental properties of things such as individual people, cats, trees, and tables? Almost everyone agrees that such individuals could have been different, in certain respects, from the way that they actually are. But what are the respects in which they could not have been different: which of their properties are essential to their being the individuals that they are? And why?"."
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