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Inadequacy of nation-based and VaR-based safety nets in the European Union

Author: Edward J Kane; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 12170.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
"Considered as a social contract, a financial safety net imposes duties and confers rights on different sectors of the economy. Within a nation, elements of incompleteness inherent in this contract generate principal-agent conflicts that are mitigated by formal agreements, norms, laws, and the principle of democratic accountability. Across nations, additional layers of incompleteness emerge that are hard to  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Edward J Kane; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 66899719
Notes: Cover title.
Description: 1 online resource (1 volume).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 12170.
Responsibility: Edward J. Kane.

Abstract:

"Considered as a social contract, a financial safety net imposes duties and confers rights on different sectors of the economy. Within a nation, elements of incompleteness inherent in this contract generate principal-agent conflicts that are mitigated by formal agreements, norms, laws, and the principle of democratic accountability. Across nations, additional layers of incompleteness emerge that are hard to moderate. This paper shows that nationalistic biases and leeway in principles used to measure value-at-risk and bank capital make it unlikely that the crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution schemes incorporated in Basel II and EU Directives could allocate losses imbedded in troubled institutions efficiently or fairly across member nations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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