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|All Authors / Contributors:||
James M Buchanan; Yong J Yoon
|Description:||xvii, 146 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.|
|Contents:||Contents: Foreword Roger Congleton PART I INTRODUCTION Introduction: Political Disorder and Decay PART II ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 1. Majoritarian Logic 2. Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules 3. The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules (Buchanan and Yoon) 4. Variations on Tullock's Road Model 5. Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anti-commons 6. Majoritarian Management of the Commons 7. Universalism through common access: an alternative model of distributive politics 8. Majoritarian Exploitation of Fiscal Commons: General Taxes -Differential Transfers 9. All Voting is Strategic 10. Public Choice and the Extent of the Market 11. Choosing for Others: A Neglected Element in the Theory of Collective Action 12. The Cost of Collectivization, Per Se PART III: AMERICA'S FISCAL TRAGEDY 13. Institutional Sources of American Fiscal Tragedy Index|
|Responsibility:||the late James M. Buchanan, 1986 Nobel Laureate in Economics and Professor Emeritus, George Mason University, USA; Yong J. Yoon, Associate Professor, George Mason University, USA.|
'In these creative and imaginative essays, James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon explore new analytical territory by explaining how democratic politics can generate economic disorder. While some of