passa ai contenuti
Inertia and incentives : bridging organizational economics and organizational theory Anteprima di questo documento
ChiudiAnteprima di questo documento
Stiamo controllando…

Inertia and incentives : bridging organizational economics and organizational theory

Autore: Rebecca Henderson; Sarah Kaplan; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Editore: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research.
Serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 11849.
Edizione/Formato:   eBook : Document : EnglishVedi tutte le edizioni e i formati
Banca dati:WorldCat
Sommario:
Abstract: Organizational theorists have long acknowledged the importance of the formal and informal incentives facing a firm's employees, stressing that the political economy of a firm plays a major role in shaping organizational life and firm behavior. Yet the detailed study of incentive systems has traditionally been left in the hands of (organizational) economists, with most organizational theorists focusing  Per saperne di più…
Voto:

(non ancora votato) 0 con commenti - Diventa il primo.

Soggetti
Altri come questo

 

Trova una copia online

Collegamenti a questo documento

Trova una copia in biblioteca

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Stiamo ricercando le biblioteche che possiedono questo documento…

Dettagli

Tipo materiale: Document, Risorsa internet
Tipo documento: Internet Resource, Computer File
Tutti gli autori / Collaboratori: Rebecca Henderson; Sarah Kaplan; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Numero OCLC: 62676632
Note: December 2005.
Cover title.
Descrizione: 1 online resource (1 volume).
Titolo della serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 11849.
Responsabilità: Rebecca Henderson, Sarah Kaplan.

Abstract:

Abstract: Organizational theorists have long acknowledged the importance of the formal and informal incentives facing a firm's employees, stressing that the political economy of a firm plays a major role in shaping organizational life and firm behavior. Yet the detailed study of incentive systems has traditionally been left in the hands of (organizational) economists, with most organizational theorists focusing their attention on critical problems in culture, network structure, framing and so on -- in essence, the social context in which economics and incentive systems are embedded. We argue that this separation of domains is problematic. The economics literature, for example, is unable to explain why organizations should find it difficult to change incentive structures in the face of environmental change, while the organizational literature focuses heavily on the role of inertia as sources of organizational rigidity. Drawing on recent research on incentives in organizational economics and on cognition in organizational theory, we build a framework for the analysis of incentives that highlights the ways in which incentives and cognition -- while being analytically distinct concepts -- are phenomenologically deeply intertwined. We suggest that incentives and cognition coevolve so that organizational competencies or routines are as much about building knowledge of "what should be rewarded" as they are about "what should be done."

Commenti

Commenti degli utenti
Recuperando commenti GoodReads…
Stiamo recuperando commenti DOGObooks

Etichette

Diventa il primo.
Conferma questa richiesta

Potresti aver già richiesto questo documento. Seleziona OK se si vuole procedere comunque con questa richiesta.

Dati collegati


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62676632> # Inertia and incentives bridging organizational economics and organizational theory
    a schema:MediaObject, schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book ;
    library:oclcnum "62676632" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Topic/incentives_in_industry_econometric_models> ; # Incentives in industry--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1047856> ; # Organizational effectiveness--Evaluation
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/968516> ; # Incentives in industry--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008108711> ; # Organizational effectiveness--Evaluation
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/127108210> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/8304216> ; # Sarah Kaplan
    schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/60168346> ; # Rebecca Henderson
    schema:datePublished "2005" ;
    schema:description "Abstract: Organizational theorists have long acknowledged the importance of the formal and informal incentives facing a firm's employees, stressing that the political economy of a firm plays a major role in shaping organizational life and firm behavior. Yet the detailed study of incentive systems has traditionally been left in the hands of (organizational) economists, with most organizational theorists focusing their attention on critical problems in culture, network structure, framing and so on -- in essence, the social context in which economics and incentive systems are embedded. We argue that this separation of domains is problematic. The economics literature, for example, is unable to explain why organizations should find it difficult to change incentive structures in the face of environmental change, while the organizational literature focuses heavily on the role of inertia as sources of organizational rigidity. Drawing on recent research on incentives in organizational economics and on cognition in organizational theory, we build a framework for the analysis of incentives that highlights the ways in which incentives and cognition -- while being analytically distinct concepts -- are phenomenologically deeply intertwined. We suggest that incentives and cognition coevolve so that organizational competencies or routines are as much about building knowledge of "what should be rewarded" as they are about "what should be done.""@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/47008824> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "Inertia and incentives bridging organizational economics and organizational theory"@en ;
    schema:productID "62676632" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/62676632#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11849> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/62676632> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a bgn:Agent ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62676632> ; # Inertia and incentives bridging organizational economics and organizational theory
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62676632> ; # Inertia and incentives bridging organizational economics and organizational theory
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/47008824#Topic/incentives_in_industry_econometric_models> # Incentives in industry--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85064738> ;
    schema:name "Incentives in industry--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008108711> # Organizational effectiveness--Evaluation
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Organizational effectiveness--Evaluation"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1047856> # Organizational effectiveness--Evaluation
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Organizational effectiveness--Evaluation"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/968516> # Incentives in industry--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Incentives in industry--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/127108210> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/60168346> # Rebecca Henderson
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Henderson" ;
    schema:givenName "Rebecca" ;
    schema:name "Rebecca Henderson" ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/8304216> # Sarah Kaplan
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:birthDate "1964" ;
    schema:familyName "Kaplan" ;
    schema:givenName "Sarah" ;
    schema:name "Sarah Kaplan" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/62676632>
    a genont:InformationResource, genont:ContentTypeGenericResource ;
    schema:about <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62676632> ; # Inertia and incentives bridging organizational economics and organizational theory
    schema:dateModified "2015-03-04" ;
    void:inDataset <http://purl.oclc.org/dataset/WorldCat> ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Chiudi finestra

Per favore entra in WorldCat 

Non hai un account? Puoi facilmente crearne uno gratuito.