skip to content
Institutions and contract enforcement Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Institutions and contract enforcement

Author: Armin Falk; David Huffman; W Bentley MacLeod; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13961.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

 

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Armin Falk; David Huffman; W Bentley MacLeod; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 225907513
Notes: "April 2008."
Description: 1 online resource (46 pages).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13961.
Responsibility: Armin Falk, David Huffman, W. Bentley MacLeod.

Abstract:

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/225907513> # Institutions and contract enforcement
    a schema:MediaObject, schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book ;
    library:oclcnum "225907513" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/989889> ; # Labor contract
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/836107> ; # Bonuses (Employee fringe benefits)
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/909122> ; # Employees--Dismissal of
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Topic/labor_market_econometric_models> ; # Labor market--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/989982> ; # Labor laws and legislation--Economic aspects
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/990041> ; # Labor market--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85042881> ; # Employees--Dismissal of
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Topic/labor_laws_and_legislation_economic_aspects> ; # Labor laws and legislation--Economic aspects
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/93269238> ; # William Bentley MacLeod
    schema:contributor <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Person/huffman_david> ; # David Huffman
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/127108210> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    schema:creator <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Person/falk_armin> ; # Armin Falk
    schema:datePublished "2008" ;
    schema:description "We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/135839226> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "Institutions and contract enforcement"@en ;
    schema:productID "225907513" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/225907513#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2008> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13961> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/225907513> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Person/falk_armin> # Armin Falk
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Falk" ;
    schema:givenName "Armin" ;
    schema:name "Armin Falk" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Person/huffman_david> # David Huffman
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Huffman" ;
    schema:givenName "David" ;
    schema:name "David Huffman" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/225907513> ; # Institutions and contract enforcement
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/225907513> ; # Institutions and contract enforcement
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/135839226#Topic/labor_laws_and_legislation_economic_aspects> # Labor laws and legislation--Economic aspects
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85073691> ;
    schema:name "Labor laws and legislation--Economic aspects"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85042881> # Employees--Dismissal of
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Employees--Dismissal of"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/836107> # Bonuses (Employee fringe benefits)
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Bonuses (Employee fringe benefits)"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/909122> # Employees--Dismissal of
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Employees--Dismissal of"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/989889> # Labor contract
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Labor contract"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/989982> # Labor laws and legislation--Economic aspects
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Labor laws and legislation--Economic aspects"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/990041> # Labor market--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Labor market--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/127108210> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/93269238> # William Bentley MacLeod
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:birthDate "1954" ;
    schema:familyName "MacLeod" ;
    schema:givenName "William Bentley" ;
    schema:givenName "W. Bentley" ;
    schema:name "William Bentley MacLeod" ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.