Kant sometimes argues that all interest of reason in its worldly or cosmopolitan sense comes down to four questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? What is the human being? Fundamentally, however, the first three questions, Kant tells us, fundamentally come down to the last one. Furthermore, in his ethical philosophy, Kant insists on a philosophical division of labour, and he divides ethics into morality [Moralität] and what he refers to as a practical or moral anthropology [practische/Moral Anthropologie]. Notwithstanding his insistence about the centrality of anthropology for his philosophical vision, many scholars have tended to either neglect his anthropological works entirely, arguing that Kant does not have a conception of the human being at all. Others have claimed that because it is a largely empirical science, anthropology is a side-project, for Kant, and moreover one that is inconsistent with the critical philosophy. Contra many traditional interpretations of Kantian philosophy, this dissertation develops an interpretation of Kant's moral anthropology and argues that anthropology is not only consistent with the critical philosophy, but that it is also the most fundamental component of Kantian philosophy.