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Learning to eat soup with a knife : counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Author: John A Nagl; John Pruden
Publisher: [Ashland, OR] : Blackstone Audio, Inc., 2012.
Edition/Format:   eAudiobook : MP3 : English : UnabridgedView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl?a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq?considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Audiobooks
History
Additional Physical Format: Hard copy version:
Nagl, John A., 1966-
Learning to eat soup with a knife.
[Ashland, OR] : Blackstone Audio, Inc., p2012
(OCoLC)802714010
Material Type: Audio book, etc., Sound recording, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File, Sound Recording
All Authors / Contributors: John A Nagl; John Pruden
ISBN: 9781455162796 1455162795
OCLC Number: 810481324
Notes: "With a new preface on the author's combat experience in Iraq."
Originally published with the title: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
Performer(s): Read by John Pruden.
Description: 1 sound file (8 hr., 46 min., 44 sec.) : digital.
Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Requires OverDrive Media Console (WMA file size: 126183 KB; MP3 file size: 246995 KB).
Contents: pt. 1. Setting the stage. How armies learn --
The hard lesson of insurgency --
The British and American armies: separated by a common language --
pt. 2. Malaya. British army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan emergency, 1948-1951 --
The empire strikes back: British army counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1952-1957 --
pt. 3. Vietnam. The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the advisory years, 1950-1964 --
The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the fighting years, 1965-1972 --
pt. 4. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Hard lessons: the British and American armies learn counterinsurgency --
Organizational culture and learning institutions: learning to eat soup with a knife.
Other Titles: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
Responsibility: by John A. Nagl.

Abstract:

Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl?a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq?considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl?the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass?argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency.

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