Leibniz : determinist, theist, idealist

Preface vii-viii
Introduction 3-6
Part I. Determinism: Contingency and Identity
Ch. 1. Leibniz's Theories of Contingency 9
1.1. Leibniz's First Main Solution 10
1.1.1 On the Brink of the Precipice 10
1.1.2 Things Possible in Their Own Nature 12
1.1.3 Hypothetical Necessity 16
1.1.4 The Reality of Choice 20
1.1.5 Moral Necessity 21
1.2. Leibniz's Second Main Solution 22
1.2.1 The Contingency of Which World Is Best 23
1.2.2 Necessity, Demonstrability, and Infinite Analysis 25
1.2.3 Contingent Connections among Possibles as Such 30
1.2.4 Reasons That Incline without Necessitating 34
1.2.5 Is 'God Chooses What Is Best' Contingent? 36
1.2.6 An Exception for Existence? 42
1.3. Leibniz and Possible Worlds Semantics 46
1.4. On Leibniz's Sincerity 50
Ch. 2. The Logic of Counterfactual Non-identity 53
2.1. Problems of Transworld Identity 53
2.2. The Conceptual Containment Theory of Truth 57
2.3. Actuality in the Conceptual Containment Theory 63
2.4. An Anti-Semantical Theory of Truth 65
2.5. Why Did Leibniz Hold the Conceptual Containment Theory? 67
2.6. Conceptual Containment and Transworld Identity 71
Ch. 3. The Metaphysics of Counterfactual Nonidentity 75
3.1. Substance and Law 77
3.2. Substance and Miracle 81
3.2.1 The Kingdom of Nature and the Kingdom of Grace 82
3.2.2 "Essence" and "Nature" 85
3.2.2.1 Substantial Form as "Nature" 87
3.2.2.2 Substantial Form as "Essence" 89
3.2.3 "Miracles of the First Rank": Creation, Conservation, Incarnation, Annihilation 94
3.2.4 The Modal Issue 99
3.3. Perception and Relations 102
3.4. Conclusions 106
Appendix [to Ch. 3]: 'A Priori' and 'A Posteriori' 109-10
Part II. Theism: God and Being
Ch. 4. The Ens Perfectissimum 113
4.1. Absolute Qualities as "Requirements" of Things 115
4.2. Sensible Qualities, Knowledge, and Perfection 119
4.3. Is Leibniz's Conception of God Spinozistic? 123
4.3.1 Leibniz's Views in 1676 123
4.3.2 Leibniz's Later Views 130
Ch. 5. The Ontological Argument 135
5.1. The Incomplete Proof 136
5.2. Proof of Possibility 141
5.2.1 The First Stage of the Proof 142
5.2.2 The Second Stage of the Proof: One Version 148
5.2.3 The Second Stage: Another Version 151
Ch. 6. Existence and Essence 157
6.1. Is Existence an Essential Quality of God? 158
6.2. Defining Existence 164
6.3. Existence Irreducible 170
Ch. 7. The Root of Possibility 177
7.1. The Proof of the Existence of God from the Reality of Eternal Truths 177
7.2. Leibniz's Theory Examined 184
7.2.1 Circularity or Self-Existence? 184
7.2.2 God and the Epistemology of Logic and Mathematics 186
7.2.3 Truth and Divine Understanding 189
Ch. 8. Presumption of Possibility 192
8.1. Jurisprudence and Pragmatism in Theology 194
8.2. Jurisprudence and the Logic of Probability 198
8.3. A Proof for the Presumption of Possibility 202
8.4. Presuming the Possibility of Beings as Such 206
8.5. Objections Considered 209-13
Part III. Idealism: Monads and Bodies
Ch. 9. Leibniz's Phenomenalism 217
9.1. Phenomena 219
9.1.1 What Are Phenomena? 219
9.1.2 Leibniz and Berkeley 224
9.1.3 The Phenomenality of Physical Qualities 228
9.1.3.1 Shape 229
9.1.3.2 Continuity 232
9.2. Esse Is Percipi 235
9.3. Aggregates 241
9.3.1 Aggregates of What? 241
9.3.2 The Ontological Status of Aggregates 244
9.3.3 The Principle of Aggregation 247
9.3.4 Space 253
9.4. The Reality of Phenomena 255
Ch. 10. Corporeal Substance 262
10.1. Bodies and Corporeal Substances 262
10.2. The Structure of a Corporeal Substance: Alternative Interpretations 265
10.2.1 The Two-Substance Conception 265
10.2.2 One-Substance Conceptions 267
10.2.3 Complete and Incomplete Substances 269
10.3. The Structure of a Corporeal Substance: Some Texts 274
10.3.1 The Fardella Memo (1690) 274
10.3.2 Bernoulli's Questions 277
10.3.3 To De Volder (Draft), June 1703 282
10.3.4 To De Volder, January 1700 283
10.4. Monadic Domination 285
10.4.1 Directness of Mutual Expression 286
10.4.2 Domination and Organic Functions 289
10.5. Principles of Unity 291
10.5.1 The Middle Years 292
10.5.2 From Tournemine to the Theodicy 295
10.5.3 Letters to Des Bosses (1712-16) 299
10.5.4 Conclusions 303
Ch. 11. Form and Matter in Leibniz's Middle Years 308
11.1. Form 309
11.1.1 Form as Force 309
11.1.2 Form as Law 314
11.1.3 Form as Soul 316
11.1.4 Leibniz and Cudworth 320
11.2. Matter 324
11.2.1 The Analysis of Extension 326
11.2.1.1 Survey of Objections to This Interpretation 328
11.2.1.2 The Enduring Interest of This Argument 332
11.2.2 Infinite Divisibilty 333
11.3. Realism 338
Ch. 12. Primary Matter 341
12.1. Three Senses of 'Matter' in a Letter to Arnauld 341
12.1.1 Cartesian Matter 342
12.1.2 Secondary Matter 345
12.1.3 Primary Matter 347
12.2. Matter and the Eucharist 349
12.2.1 To Pellison (January 1692) 349
12.2.2 Leibniz's Solution to the Problem of Multipresence 353
12.2.3 "On Transubstantiation" (1670) 358
12.3. Bernoulli's Questions 361
12.4. The Debate about Thinking Matter 364
12.4.1 The Impossibility of Purely Material Substance 366
12.4.2 The Argument from the Mechanical Nature of Matter 367
12.4.3 The Argument from the Simplicity of Thinking Substance 369
12.4.4 The Argument from the Passivity of Matter 369
12.5. Conclusions 375
Ch. 13. Primitive and Derivative Forces 378
13.1. The "Mixed" Character of Derivative Forces 378
13.1.1 How Are Physical and Intramonadic Forces Related? 378
13.1.2 Can the Problem Be Solved? 382
13.1.3 Issues from the Later Years 386
13.2. Primary Matter and Quantity 393-9
Bibliography 401
Index of Leibniz Texts Cited 411
General Index 423-33