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The Likelihood of Knowledge

Author: Robert G Meyers
Publisher: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1988.
Series: Philosophical studies series, 38.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
It is convenient to divide the theory of knowledge into three sets of problems: 1. the nature of knowledge, certainty and related notions, 2. the nature and validi ty of the sources of knowledge, and 3. answers to skeptical arguments. The first set includes questions such as: What is it to know that something is the case? Does knowledge imply certainty? If not, how do they differ? What are the con ditions of  Read more...
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Details

Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Robert G Meyers
ISBN: 9789400929050 9400929056
OCLC Number: 851368441
Description: 1 online resource (204 pages).
Contents: 1: Knowledge and Certainty --
1. Three Conditions of Certainty --
2. Modal Accounts of Certainty --
3. The Infallibilist's View of Certainty --
4. Direct Knowledge and Infallibility --
2: Certainty and Fallibilism --
1. Possible Mistakes About Necessity --
2. Incorrigibility of the Cogito --
3. Certainty and the Cogito --
3: Certainty and Sensations --
1. The Fallibilist Argument --
2. Standard Objections --
3. Are Basic Propositions Incorrigible? --
4: The Nature of Justification --
1. Theories of Justification --
2. Abilities and Reasons --
3. Proof and Justification --
4. The Nature of Justification --
5. Alternative Explanations --
6. Social-Aspect Cases --
5: Justification and the Gettier Problem --
1. The Gettier Problem --
2. Causal and Defeasibility Theories --
3. Evidence and Truth --
4. Some Counterexamples --
6: Perceptual Knowledge and Physical Objects --
1. Perception and the Given --
2. Recognition and Perceptual Knowledge --
3. Further Restrictions --
4. Inferential and Non-Inferential --
5. Abilities and Justified Belief --
6. Direct Perception of Physical Objects --
7: Foundations and Coherence --
1. Experience and the Coherence Theory --
2. The Nature of Coherence --
3. Circularity and Coherence --
4. Reliability and Coherence --
8: Skepticism and Rationality --
1. Knowledge and Certainty --
2. Dire-Possibility Arguments --
3. The Problem of the Criterion --
4. Internalism vs. Externalism --
5. Rationality and Justification --
Select Bibliography --
Index of Names --
Index of Subjects.
Series Title: Philosophical studies series, 38.
Responsibility: by Robert G. Meyers.

Abstract:

It is convenient to divide the theory of knowledge into three sets of problems: 1. the nature of knowledge, certainty and related notions, 2. the nature and validi ty of the sources of knowledge, and 3. answers to skeptical arguments. The first set includes questions such as: What is it to know that something is the case? Does knowledge imply certainty? If not, how do they differ? What are the con ditions of knowledge? What is it to be justified in accepting something? The sec ond deals with the ways in which knowledge can be acquired. Traditional sources have included sources of premisses such as perception, memory, in trospection, innateness, revelation, testimony, and methods for drawing conclu sions such as induction and deduction, among others. Under this heading, philosophers have asked: Does innateness provide knowledge? Under what con ditions are beliefs from perception, testimony and memory justified? When does induction yield justified belief? Can induction itself be justified? Debates in this area have sometimes led philosophers to question sources (e. g., revela tion, innateness) but usually the aim has been to clarify and increase our understanding of the notion of knowledge. The third class includes the peren nial puzzles taught to beginning students: the existence of other minds, the problem of the external world (along with questions about idealism and phenomenalism), and more general skeptical problems such as the problem of the criterion. These sets of questions are related.

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