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|Material Type:||Thesis/dissertation, Internet resource|
|Document Type:||Internet Resource|
|All Authors / Contributors:||
|Notes:||Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-06, Section: A, page: 2331.
Adviser: Joel Mokyr.
A study of the Kibbutzim allows us to deal with fundamental questions in economics such as how insurance can be provided despite the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, how moral hazard and adverse selection shape contractual relationships, and how these problems are solved in egalitarian partnerships. I address the following questions: how did the voluntary egalitarian Kibbutzim coexist with a more capitalist environment? What level of equality can be sustained within a Kibbutz as an equilibrium? What is the role of economic forces in the behavior of Kibbutzim and in members' migration decisions? I find that Kibbutzim are self-enforcing organizations, whose behavior is shaped by the tradeoffs between insurance and incentives. The analysis suggests that in the foreseeable future, the Kibbutzim can continue to survive in a changing economic environment, even if in an altered form.