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Litigiousness, contract design and the economic motives of the contingent fee lawyer

Author: Sung-Ho J Ahn; Rand Corporation.
Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 1998.
Series: P (Rand Corporation), P-8034.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Previous studies of the contingent fee contract between an attorney and client have relied on several unnecessarily simplistic assumptions. The author revised these assumptions and obtained the following results. First, a two-tiered, or sliding scale, contingent fee contract has implications in conflict with those resulting from a simple one-tier contract. Second, the total caseload of a contingent fee lawyer  Read more...
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Additional Physical Format: Online version:
Ahn, Sung-Ho J.
Litigiousness, contract design and the economic motives of the contingent fee lawyer.
Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 1998
(OCoLC)777341038
Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Sung-Ho J Ahn; Rand Corporation.
OCLC Number: 40729430
Notes: Cover title.
"P-8034"--Cover.
"December 8, 1998"--Caption.
Description: 21 pages : illustrations ; 28 cm
Series Title: P (Rand Corporation), P-8034.
Responsibility: Sung-Ho J. Ahn.

Abstract:

Previous studies of the contingent fee contract between an attorney and client have relied on several unnecessarily simplistic assumptions. The author revised these assumptions and obtained the following results. First, a two-tiered, or sliding scale, contingent fee contract has implications in conflict with those resulting from a simple one-tier contract. Second, the total caseload of a contingent fee lawyer influences his economic motives and may reduce the welfare of some or all of his clients. Finally, the sliding scale contract can explain previous empirical findings comparing outcomes between cases involving contingent fee lawyers and those involving hourly fee lawyers.

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