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Lotteries in student assignment : an equivalence result

Author: Parag A Pathak; Jay Sethuraman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2010.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 16140.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Parag A Pathak; Jay Sethuraman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 644278174
Notes: "June 2010."
Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/16140 viewed June 28, 2010.
Description: 1 online resource (22 pages).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 16140.
Responsibility: Parag A. Pathak, Jay Sethuraman.

Abstract:

This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms -- Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment -- are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.

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