skip to content
Macroprudential regulation versus mopping up after the crash Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Macroprudential regulation versus mopping up after the crash

Author: Olivier Jeanne; Anton Korinek; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2013.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 18675.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This paper compares ex-ante policy measures (such as macroprudential regulation) and ex-post policy interventions (such as bailouts) to respond to financial crises in models of financial amplification, i.e. models in which falling asset prices, declining net worth and tightening financial constraints reinforce each other. The optimal policy mix in such models involves a combination of both types of measures since  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Olivier Jeanne; Anton Korinek; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 823650614
Notes: Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/18675 viewed January 8, 2013.
"January 2013."
Description: 1 online resource (42 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 18675.
Responsibility: Olivier Jeanne, Anton Korinek.

Abstract:

This paper compares ex-ante policy measures (such as macroprudential regulation) and ex-post policy interventions (such as bailouts) to respond to financial crises in models of financial amplification, i.e. models in which falling asset prices, declining net worth and tightening financial constraints reinforce each other. The optimal policy mix in such models involves a combination of both types of measures since they offer alternative ways of mitigating binding financial constraints. Comparing their relative merits, ex-post policy interventions are only taken once a crisis has materialized and are therefore better targeted, whereas ex-ante measures are blunter since they depend on crisis expectations. However, ex-post interventions distort incentives and create moral hazard. This introduces a time consistency problem, which can in turn be solved by ex-ante policy measures. Limiting ex-post transfers to the revenue accumulated in a bailout fund reduces welfare.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/823650614> # Macroprudential regulation versus mopping up after the crash
    a schema:Book, schema:CreativeWork, schema:MediaObject ;
    library:oclcnum "823650614" ;
    library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
    library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/924608> ; # Financial crises--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Topic/bailouts_government_policy_econometric_models> ; # Bailouts (Government policy)--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://dewey.info/class/330/> ;
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Topic/monetary_policy_econometric_models> ; # Monetary policy--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1025234> ; # Monetary policy--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Topic/intervention_federal_government_econometric_models> ; # Intervention (Federal government)--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008107910> ; # Monetary policy--Econometric models
    schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Topic/financial_crises_econometric_models> ; # Financial crises--Econometric models
    schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/66212372> ; # Anton Korinek
    schema:copyrightYear "2013" ;
    schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/79158251> ; # Olivier Jeanne
    schema:datePublished "2013" ;
    schema:description "This paper compares ex-ante policy measures (such as macroprudential regulation) and ex-post policy interventions (such as bailouts) to respond to financial crises in models of financial amplification, i.e. models in which falling asset prices, declining net worth and tightening financial constraints reinforce each other. The optimal policy mix in such models involves a combination of both types of measures since they offer alternative ways of mitigating binding financial constraints. Comparing their relative merits, ex-post policy interventions are only taken once a crisis has materialized and are therefore better targeted, whereas ex-ante measures are blunter since they depend on crisis expectations. However, ex-post interventions distort incentives and create moral hazard. This introduces a time consistency problem, which can in turn be solved by ex-ante policy measures. Limiting ex-post transfers to the revenue accumulated in a bailout fund reduces welfare."@en ;
    schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/1193419677> ;
    schema:inLanguage "en" ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
    schema:name "Macroprudential regulation versus mopping up after the crash"@en ;
    schema:productID "823650614" ;
    schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/823650614#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2013> ;
    schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w18675> ;
    schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/18675> ;
    schema:url <http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=http://papers.nber.org/papers/> ;
    wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/823650614> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
    schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/823650614> ; # Macroprudential regulation versus mopping up after the crash
    schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
    schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/823650614> ; # Macroprudential regulation versus mopping up after the crash
    schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Topic/bailouts_government_policy_econometric_models> # Bailouts (Government policy)--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2011003511> ;
    schema:name "Bailouts (Government policy)--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Topic/intervention_federal_government_econometric_models> # Intervention (Federal government)--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067542> ;
    schema:name "Intervention (Federal government)--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1193419677#Topic/monetary_policy_econometric_models> # Monetary policy--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Monetary policy--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008107910> # Monetary policy--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Monetary policy--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1025234> # Monetary policy--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008107910> ; # Monetary policy--Econometric models
    schema:name "Monetary policy--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/924608> # Financial crises--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
    schema:name "Financial crises--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
    schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/66212372> # Anton Korinek
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Korinek" ;
    schema:givenName "Anton" ;
    schema:name "Anton Korinek" ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/79158251> # Olivier Jeanne
    a schema:Person ;
    schema:familyName "Jeanne" ;
    schema:givenName "Olivier" ;
    schema:name "Olivier Jeanne" ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.