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Making moral sense : beyond Habermas and Gauthier

著者: Logi Gunnarsson
出版商: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000.
丛书: Cambridge studies in philosophy.
版本/格式:   图书 : 英语查看所有的版本和格式
提要:
"Logi Gunnarsson takes issue with the assumption made by many philosophers faced with the problem of reconciling moral norms with a scientific world view, namely that morality must be offered a non-moral justification based on a formal concept of rationality. He argues that the criteria for the rationality of an action are irreducibly substantive, rather than purely formal, and that assuming that morality must be  再读一些...
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详细书目

提及的人: Jürgen Habermas; David P Gauthier; Jürgen Habermas; David P Gauthier; Jürgen Habermas; David P Gauthier
材料类型: 互联网资源
文件类型: 书, 互联网资源
所有的著者/提供者: Logi Gunnarsson
ISBN: 0521780233 9780521780230
OCLC号码: 43109837
注意: Based on the author's thesis (doctoral)--University of Pittsburgh, 1995.
描述: xi, 286 p. ; 22 cm.
内容: Pt. I. Problems. 1. The justificatory crisis of morality. 2. Alternative resolutions of the justificatory crisis. 3. Subjective reasons. 4. Substantive reasons. 5. Overcoming rationalism --
Pt. II. Against Rationalism. 6. Gauthier's contractarianism. 7. From here to pre-social agreement. 8. Habermas' discourse ethics. 9. Discoursing about discourse --
Pt. III. For the Substantive Approach. 10. Self-understanding and self-assessment. 11. The possibility of progress. 12. Practical arguments vs. impossibility arguments. 13. Evaluation of others. 14. Universality without neutrality --
Pt. IV. For Particularist Substantivism. 15. Against formalism. 16. Particularist substantivism vs. list-substantivism.
丛书名: Cambridge studies in philosophy.
责任: Logi Gunnarsson.
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摘要:

"Logi Gunnarsson takes issue with the assumption made by many philosophers faced with the problem of reconciling moral norms with a scientific world view, namely that morality must be offered a non-moral justification based on a formal concept of rationality. He argues that the criteria for the rationality of an action are irreducibly substantive, rather than purely formal, and that assuming that morality must be given a non-moral justification amounts to a distortion of both rationality and morality. His discussion includes substantial critical engagement with major thinkers from two very different philosophical traditions, and is notable for its clear and succinct account of Habermas' discourse ethics. It will appeal to anyone interested in practical reason and the rational credentials of morality."--Jacket.

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