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Matching and price competition

Author: Jeremy Bulow; Jonathan Levin; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2005.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 11506.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Jeremy Bulow; Jonathan Levin; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 61271469
Notes: "July 2005."
Description: 31 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 11506.
Responsibility: Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin.

Abstract:

"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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