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Misunderstanding financial crises : why we don't see them coming

Author: Gary Gorton
Publisher: New York : Oxford University Press, ©2012.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. In this book the author argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. The book offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic  Read more...
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Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Gary Gorton
ISBN: 9780199922901 019992290X
OCLC Number: 780288789
Description: xiv, 278 pages : illustrations, map ; 25 cm
Contents: Introduction --
Creating the quiet period --
Financial crises --
Liquidity and secrets --
Credit booms and manias --
The timing of crises --
Economic theory without history --
Debt during crises --
The quiet period and its end --
Moral hazard and too-big-to-fail --
Bank capital --
Fat cats, crisis costs, and the paradox of financial crises --
The panic of 2007-8 --
The theory and practice of seeing.
Responsibility: Gary B. Gorton.
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An explanation and history of financial crises.  Read more...

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Gorton brings to the question a combination of historical perspective, academic expertise and, unlike most academics, personal experience...his book is a refreshing and valuable account that should Read more...

 
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