skip to content
Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts

Author: Michel A Habib
Publisher: Springer
Edition/Format: Article Article : English
Publication:European Finance Review, 1, no. 2 (1997): 139
Database:ArticleFirst
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

More like this

 

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving;

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Document Type: Article
All Authors / Contributors: Michel A Habib
ISSN:1572-3097
Language Note: English
Unique Identifier: 361231855
Awards:
Description: 24

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

All user tags (1)

View most popular tags as: tag list | tag cloud

Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/361231855>
library:oclcnum"361231855"
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/361231855>
rdf:typeschema:Article
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"1997-01-01"
schema:description"We present a possible explanation for the lack of permanence of the very high levels of concentration of ownership that accompany leveraged buyouts. We first argue that some diffusion of ownership can be beneficial to the shareholders of a firm by encouraging the employees of the firm to enter into implicit contracts with the firm. The level of concentration of ownership that maximizes firm value is therefore that which trades off the well-known gains from monitoring with the gains from implicit contracting. We then argue that, in the process of concentrating the ownership of a firm that has excessively diffuse ownership to a level that maximizes firm value, investors in leveraged buyouts will choose an initial level of concentration of ownership that is very high. They will do so in order to put pressure on managers to breach existing implicit contracts. Following the breach of these contracts, investors will decrease the level of concentration of ownership to the level that maximizes firm value. There will be no further breach of implicit contracts, for such breach is incidental to the transformation of the firm from one that has excessively diffuse ownership to one that has the optimal level of diffusion of ownership. No change in the concentration of ownership therefore occurs once the level of diffusion of ownership that maximizes firm value has been attained."
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/74107625>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:isPartOf
schema:name"Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts"
schema:pageStart"139"
schema:publisher
schema:url

Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.