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Moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation

Author: Richard Arnott; Joseph E Stiglitz
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1983.
Series: National Bureau of Economic Research.; Working paper
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
"The central result of this paper is that when moral hazard ispresent, competitive equilibrium is almost always (constrained) inefficient. Moral hazard causes shadow prices to deviate from market prices. To remedy this market failure, the government could introduce differential commodity taxation. Moral hazard causes people to take too little care to prevent accidents. The corresponding dead-weight loss can be  Read more...
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Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Arnott, Richard.
Moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation.
Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1983
(OCoLC)12896882
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Richard Arnott; Joseph E Stiglitz
OCLC Number: 903523298
Reproduction Notes: Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2011. MiAaHDL
Description: 1 online resource (49 pages)
Details: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Series Title: National Bureau of Economic Research.; Working paper
Responsibility: Richard Arnott, Joseph E. Stiglitz.

Abstract:

"The central result of this paper is that when moral hazard ispresent, competitive equilibrium is almost always (constrained) inefficient. Moral hazard causes shadow prices to deviate from market prices. To remedy this market failure, the government could introduce differential commodity taxation. Moral hazard causes people to take too little care to prevent accidents. The corresponding dead-weight loss can be reduced by subsidizing (taxing) those goods the consumption of which encourages (discourages) accident avoidance. At the (constrained) optimum, the sum of the deadweight losses as-sociated with moral hazard, on the one hand, and differential commodity taxation, on the other, is minimized"--NBER website.

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