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Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the European Union : is prompt corrective action partly the solution?

Auteur : David G Mayes; María Nieto; Larry Wall; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Éditeur: [Atlanta, Ga.] : Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, [2007]
Collection: Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), 2007-9.
Édition/format:   Livre électronique : Document : Publication gouvernementale nationale : Anglais
Résumé:
"This paper discusses the institutional changes needed in Europe if prompt corrective action (PCA) is to be effective in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups' financial condition to prudential supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by prudential  Lire la suite...
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Détails

Type d’ouvrage: Document, Publication gouvernementale, Publication gouvernementale nationale, Ressource Internet
Type de document: Ressource Internet, Fichier d'ordinateur
Tous les auteurs / collaborateurs: David G Mayes; María Nieto; Larry Wall; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Numéro OCLC: 156975943
Description: 1 online resource.
Détails: System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Titre de collection: Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), 2007-9.
Responsabilité: David G. Mayes, Maria J. Nieto, and Larry Wall.

Résumé:

"This paper discusses the institutional changes needed in Europe if prompt corrective action (PCA) is to be effective in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups' financial condition to prudential supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by prudential supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank in a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site.

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