コンテンツへ移動
Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the European Union : is prompt corrective action partly the solution? 資料のプレビュー
閉じる資料のプレビュー
確認中…

Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the European Union : is prompt corrective action partly the solution?

著者: David G Mayes; María Nieto; Larry Wall; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
出版: [Atlanta, Ga.] : Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, [2007]
シリーズ: Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), 2007-9.
エディション/フォーマット:   電子書籍 : Document : National government publication : English
データベース:WorldCat
概要:
"This paper discusses the institutional changes needed in Europe if prompt corrective action (PCA) is to be effective in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups' financial condition to prudential supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by prudential  続きを読む
評価:

(まだ評価がありません) 0 件のレビュー - 是非あなたから!

件名:
関連情報:

 

オンラインで入手

この資料へのリンク

オフラインで入手

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; この資料の所蔵館を検索中…

詳細

資料の種類: Document, Government publication, National government publication, インターネット資料
ドキュメントの種類: インターネットリソース, コンピューターファイル
すべての著者/寄与者: David G Mayes; María Nieto; Larry Wall; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
OCLC No.: 156975943
物理形態: 1 online resource
詳細: System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
シリーズタイトル: Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), 2007-9.
責任者: David G. Mayes, Maria J. Nieto, and Larry Wall.

概要:

"This paper discusses the institutional changes needed in Europe if prompt corrective action (PCA) is to be effective in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups' financial condition to prudential supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by prudential supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank in a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site.

レビュー

ユーザーレビュー
GoodReadsのレビューを取得中…
DOGObooksのレビューを取得中…

タグ

まずはあなたから!
リクエストの確認

あなたは既にこの資料をリクエストしている可能性があります。このリクエストを続行してよろしければ、OK を選択してください。

リンクデータ


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/156975943>
library:oclcnum"156975943"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/156975943>
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:bookFormatschema:EBook
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2007"
schema:description""This paper discusses the institutional changes needed in Europe if prompt corrective action (PCA) is to be effective in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups' financial condition to prudential supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by prudential supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank in a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/1806486318>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the European Union is prompt corrective action partly the solution?"@en
schema:publisher
schema:url<http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0709.pdf>
schema:url<http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=B440AF7E-5056-9F12-12171139DDCCB6C2&method=display>
schema:url
schema:url<http://bibpurl.oclc.org/web/43983/wp0709.pdf>

Content-negotiable representations

ウインドウを閉じる

WorldCatにログインしてください 

アカウントをお持ちではないですか?簡単に 無料アカウントを作成することができます。.